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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three papers; the first is published in Annals of Operations Re-
search, the second is nearing submission to INFORMS Journal on Computing, and the third is the
predecessor of a paper nearing submission to Progress in Nuclear Energy. We apply operations
research techniques to nuclear waste disposal and nuclear safeguards. Although these fields are dif-
ferent, they allow us to showcase some benefits of using operations research techniques to enhance
nuclear energy applications. The first paper, “Optimizing High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal
within a Deep Geologic Repository,” presents a mixed-integer programming model that deter-
mines where to place high-level nuclear waste packages in a deep geologic repository to minimize
heat load concentration. We develop a heuristic that increases the size of solvable model instances.
The second paper, “Optimally Configuring a Measurement System to Detect Diversions from a
Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” introduces a simulation-optimization algorithm and an integer-programming
model to find the best, or near-best, resource-limited nuclear fuel cycle measurement system with
a high degree of confidence. Given location-dependent measurement method precisions, we (i)
optimize the configuration of n methods at n locations of a hypothetical nuclear fuel cycle facility,
(ii) find the most important location at which to improve method precision, and (iii) determine the
effect of measurement frequency on near-optimal configurations and objective values. Our results
correspond to existing outcomes but we obtain them at least an order of magnitude faster. The third
paper, “Optimizing Nuclear Material Control and Accountability Measurement Systems,” extends
the integer program from the second paper to locate measurement methods in a larger, hypothetical
nuclear fuel cycle scenario given fixed purchase and utilization budgets. This paper also presents
two mixed-integer quadratic programming models to increase the precision of existing methods
given a fixed improvement budget and to reduce the measurement uncertainty in the system while
limiting improvement costs. We quickly obtain similar or better solutions compared to several
intuitive analyses that take much longer to perform.
iii
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Operations research is a field that uses various analytical techniques to make better, more in-
formed decisions by combining methods such as statistical analysis and mathematical modeling
to arrive at optimal or near-optimal solutions to complex problems. We apply operations research
techniques to two distinct fields within the nuclear energy industry: nuclear waste disposal and
nuclear safeguards. Although these fields are very different, they allow us to showcase some bene-
fits of using operations research techniques to enhance nuclear energy applications; these benefits
include reducing solution times, increasing the size of solvable model instances, and providing
higher quality solutions.
Mathematical programming models require input parameters, decision variables, an objective
function, and problem-specific constraints. Input parameters are fixed values that depict physical
aspects of reality. Parameters can also include physical or desired limits on system variable val-
ues. Decision variables represent continuous or discrete outputs of the problem that are initially
unknown and are determined by finding the optimal or near-optimal solution to the problem. The
objective function is a combination of parameters and decision variables that describes the goal
of the problem. Constraints are needed to ensure that limitations imposed by the nature of the
problem are upheld.
The civilian nuclear fuel cycle is a set of industrial processes that utilize naturally occurring ura-
nium from the time it is mined as ore, converted into an energy source, and permanently disposed
underground after its energy value is depleted. Nuclear waste disposal consists of permanently dis-
posing of nuclear materials and other materials that have been contaminated with radioactivity, and
requires careful planning and proper implementation. However, little work has been documented
on methods to find the best way to fill a nuclear waste repository while achieving desired objectives
and meeting operational constraints. We develop a mixed-integer programming model that deter-
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mines where to place nuclear waste packages in a given time period with the goal of minimizing
heat load concentration within a repository. The result is an optimal, reproducible schedule for
nuclear waste placement.
We use Yucca Mountain as a case study because it was planned to be the United States’ perma-
nent repository for high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel; however, due to political opposition,
construction stopped in 2010 after an estimated $15 billion was spent on research and development
(McCullough Jr., 2014). Many other countries are also generating large quantities of nuclear waste
which will have to be permanently disposed of. Our mathematical model can be easily applied to
any other deep-geologic repository constructed around the world for nuclear waste disposal.
The dangerous ability to create nuclear weapons from enriched uranium and plutonium makes
it imperative to account closely for these materials as they progress through a nuclear fuel cycle
because of their possible loss or diversion (i.e., theft). The International Atomic Energy Agency
implements a group of activities, called nuclear safeguards, which try to ensure its 140 member
states are not using their civilian nuclear fuel cycles to produce nuclear weapons (International
Atomic Energy Agency, 2016). One type of nuclear safeguard, material control and accountabil-
ity, attempts to prevent the illicit acquisition of nuclear materials, such as enriched uranium, and the
subsequent development of weapons, by detecting and deterring the loss of these materials from
within a nuclear fuel cycle (U.S. Department of Energy, 2011). A material control and account-
ability measurement system establishes the material and inventory balance of nuclear material at
one or more nuclear fuel cycle facilities (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002).
We develop a simulation-optimization algorithm and an integer-programming model to find the
best, or near-best, resource-limited measurement system with a high degree of confidence. The
simulation-optimization algorithm minimizes a weighted sum of false positive and false negative
diversion-detection probabilities while accounting for material flows, inventory levels, and mea-
surement errors across a finite, discrete time horizon in hypothetical non-diversion and diversion
contexts. In each time period, the estimated cumulative material-unaccounted-for (MUF) is com-
pared to a fixed or optimized threshold value to assess if a “significant amount of material” is
2
lost from the system. The integer-programming model minimizes the population variance of the
estimated MUF in a measurement system. We also develop mixed-integer quadratic program-
ming models to increase the precision of existing measurement methods in a system given a fixed
improvement budget and to reduce the measurement uncertainty in the system while limiting im-
provement costs.
This dissertation contributes to the operations research, nuclear engineering, and statistics liter-
ature. We add to the operations research literature by introducing unique models that are flexible
and extensible, and by utilizing various techniques to increase the size of solvable instances and
to reduce solution times. We use these models to extend the nuclear engineering literature by pro-
viding better solutions to nuclear waste disposal and nuclear safeguards problems more quickly
than existing or intuitive methods. This dissertation also examines the relationship between false
positive and false negative diversion-detection probabilities and the population variance of the es-
timated MUF in a measurement system to expand the statistics literature.
The primary contributions of this dissertation are organized as follows: in Chapter 2, we develop
a mixed-integer programming model to optimize nuclear waste disposal scheduling, which can fea-
ture various possible objectives (e.g., minimize heat load, minimize radiation exposure, minimize
cost) and can be tailored to other repositories around the world. We implement multiple perfor-
mance enhancements to reduce solution times and increase the size of solvable model instances.
Chapter 3 introduces a simulation-optimization algorithm and an integer-programming model to
optimally configure nuclear fuel cycle measurement systems, which (i) feature different objectives
(e.g., minimize the weighted sum of false positive and false negative diversion-detection probabil-
ities, minimize the population variance of the estimated MUF), (ii) easily solve different nuclear
fuel cycle scenarios, and (iii) greatly reduce solution times compared to a Monte Carlo simulation.
In Chapter 4, we formulate mixed-integer quadratic programming models to optimize nuclear fuel
cycle measurement system improvements, which can (i) utilize different variance-based parameter
improvements (e.g., bounds, mean), (ii) consider larger nuclear fuel cycle scenarios, and (iii) solve
almost instantaneously. Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation with a summary of results.
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CHAPTER 2
OPTIMIZING HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL WITHIN A DEEP GEOLOGIC
REPOSITORY
A paper published in Annals of Operations Research1
Benjamin Johnson2, Alexandra Newman3, Jeffrey King4
2.1 Abstract
Many countries produce significant quantities of nuclear waste which will have to be perma-
nently and safely placed in a repository. We develop a mixed integer program that determines
where to place each waste package of a specific waste type in a given time period with the goal of
minimizing heat load concentration within a repository. Operational constraints include: (i) heat
load limitations, (ii) location and time at which waste packages can be placed, and (iii) the number
of waste packages that must be placed based on type and time period.
Although applicable to other settings, we use the Yucca Mountain repository in Nevada as a
case study. Each of the three objectives used for minimizing heat load concentration improves upon
existing greedy and sequential filling methods. Existing filling methods give at least a 17% to an
873% higher, i.e., worse, heat load concentration in the repository with respect to these objectives
than do optimal methods. Enhancements, i.e., symmetry reduction constraints, perturbations, and
heuristics, increase the size of solvable problem instances. This research can be applied to any deep
geologic repository planned for operation around the world with slight modifications to incorporate
site-specific objectives and constraints.
1Reprinted with permission of Annals of Operations Research, 2016, 1-23.
2Primary researcher and author, PhD Candidate, Operations Research with Engineering Program, Colorado School of
Mines
3Professor, Operations Research with Engineering Program, Colorado School of Mines
4Associate Professor, Nuclear Science and Engineering Program, Colorado School of Mines
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2.2 Introduction
Nuclear waste disposal requires careful planning and proper implementation; however, little
work has been documented on methods to find the best way to fill a repository while achieving
desired objectives and meeting operational constraints. We develop a mixed integer program that
determines where to place each waste package of a specific waste type in a given time period
with the goal of minimizing heat load concentration within a repository. The result is an optimal,
reproducible schedule for nuclear waste placement, using Yucca Mountain in Nevada as a case
study.
The United States must currently dispose of over 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste in a
permanent nuclear waste repository (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2014). This waste is being stored at
interim sites in either spent fuel pools or dry cask storage, meant only as short-term solutions with
a much higher risk of radiation leakage than permanent placement underground. Yucca Mountain
was planned to be the United States’ permanent repository for high-level waste and spent nuclear
fuel; however, due to political opposition, construction stopped in 2010 after an estimated $15
billion was spent on research and development. In addition to the R&D cost, taxpayers have had
to pay for interim storage at a current total sum of $20 billion dollars; this cost is projected to
grow by $500 million per year (McCullough Jr., 2014). Questions exist about the suitability of
Yucca Mountain to withstand all possible environmental impacts over the required 10,000 year
compliance period (Ewing & Macfarlane, 2002). However, Yucca Mountain is specified by the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendment as the only site in the United States for spent nuclear fuel
and high-level waste disposal. This means that although there is opposition to Yucca Mountain
being reopened, an alternative site is not a viable option for nuclear waste disposal unless the
Amendment is rescinded.
Many other countries are also producing large quantities of nuclear waste which will have to
be permanently disposed of. Table 2.1 shows current and future worldwide high-level nuclear
waste repository efforts (modified from World Nuclear Association (2014)). Figure 2.1 depicts
the layout of high-level waste repositories in Sweden (SKB, 2014) and Finland (Posiva, 2015),
5
Table 2.1: Worldwide high-level nuclear waste repository efforts
Country Existing facilities and progress towards final repositories
Belgium Repository construction to begin in 2035
Canada Repository site search in 2009, start filling in 2025
China Site selected by 2020, disposal beginning in 2050
Finland Repository open in 2020 (shown in Figure 2.1)
France Repository site licensed in 2015, operations beginning in 2025
Germany Repository operational in 2025
India Research being conducted for a deep geological repository




Interim storage facilities currently being used
Sweden Site selected for waste disposal (shown in Figure 2.1)
Switzerland Repository operational by 2020
United Kingdom Plans to make better progress soon on geological disposal
which are very similar to the layout of Yucca Mountain (Figure 2.3). This similarity enables the
mathematical model we develop to be easily applied to other deep geologic repositories for any
type of nuclear waste.
Figure 2.1: Proposed repository layouts in Forsmark, Sweden (left) and Olkiluoto, Finland (right)
2.2.1 Nuclear Fuel Cycle
A nuclear fuel cycle is composed of eight primary steps: mining and milling, conversion, en-
richment, fuel fabrication, reactor power production, spent fuel management, reprocessing, and
final disposal (Tsoulfanidis, 2013). Natural uranium is mined from the ground and then sent to a
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conversion facility where the milled uranium is converted into uranium hexafluoride which is nec-
essary for the enrichment process. The 0.72 atomic percent (at.%) uranium-235 in natural uranium
is separated from the rest of the uranium (0.0055 at.% uranium-234 and 99.2745 at.% uranium-
238) and then enriched to around 5 at.% for material used in power reactors and over 90 at.% for
material used for weapons development (Lewis, 2008).
After the uranium-235 is enriched, it is converted to an oxide and formed into pellets which
are packed into metal enclosures that compose the fuel rods in a reactor. Power is produced in a
reactor when nuclear fission heats up the water surrounding the fuel rods into steam, which is used
to produce electricity via a turbine. Reactor waste material is stored in cooling pools to reduce the
high heat content from radioactive decay. After the waste is cooled, it is put into dry casks and
stored above ground. Depending on the type of fuel cycle, the waste is then either reprocessed into
reusable reactor fuel or is sent for permanent disposal in an underground repository (Tsoulfanidis,
2013). Figure 2.2 shows the nuclear fuel cycle (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2014).
Figure 2.2: The nuclear fuel cycle
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2.2.2 Nuclear Waste
There are four primary types of nuclear waste: high-level waste, spent nuclear fuel, transuranic
waste, and low-level waste. Although the primary concern for deep geologic disposal around the
world includes all waste types except low-level, only high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel are
planned for placement in Yucca Mountain. These two waste types include fission products and
transuranic elements (contained in spent nuclear fuel) generated in the reactor core, which are
highly radioactive and give the waste a high heat output.
High-level waste and spent nuclear fuel are put into waste packages that are placed into drifts,
which are long tunnels mined into Yucca Mountain. Yucca Mountain has five panels (outlined in
Figure 2.3, modified from Yucca Mountain Project (2009)) that are each comprised of up to 30
drifts. Each drift (shown in Figure 2.4, modified from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(2005)) contains up to 170 slots where waste packages can be placed horizontally. The drifts in
Figure 2.4 are depicted by the horizontal lines within the panels in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Yucca Mountain drift layout
2.2.3 Yucca Mountain Operations
The total operational horizon for Yucca Mountain was planned to be 100 years, which included
construction of the repository, placement of the waste, and evaluation procedures. Placement ac-
tivities were scheduled to occur over a span of 54 years with concurrent construction activities.
Figure 2.5 shows the proposed timeline for the placement of waste packages in Yucca Mountain
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Figure 2.4: Waste package placement
based on the current supply of waste packages at interim storage facilities and the projected future
supply.
Figure 2.5: Placement timeline for Yucca Mountain
2.2.4 Waste Disposal Techniques
There are two simple methods that can be used to sequence waste disposal in a repository -
sequential filling and greedy filling. Greedy filling should theoretically reduce high heat load or
radiation concentration areas in the repository relative to sequential filling.
The sequential filling method places an available waste package in the closest unfilled slot
without considering the waste package’s characteristics. This is the most straight-forward disposal
method but does not necessarily provide a low heat load or radiation concentration in the repository.
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In terms of heat load, Figure 2.6 shows that the next waste package (4.0 kW) that arrives will be
placed in Slot 5 in Drift 1 (filling top-to-bottom and left-to-right).
The greedy filling method places an available waste package in the next unfilled slot in the
drift that currently has the lowest total heat load or radiation. In terms of heat load, Figure 2.7




















Drift 2 0.6 4.0
Drift 3 1.0
Drift 4 1.0
Figure 2.7: Greedy filling method (heat load in kW)
However, the optimization model we present determines a sequence of waste placements that
will significantly reduce heat load concentration relative to either the sequential or greedy filling
methods. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.3 provides a literature
review of previous efforts to improve nuclear waste disposal; Section 2.4 contains the mathematical
model and Section 2.5 describes how we improve model tractability. Section 2.6 provides the data
we use for the model; Section 2.7 includes an analysis of the results from solving the model and
Section 4.8 details the importance of our findings.
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2.3 Literature Review
Much of the research to improve waste disposal efforts focuses on routing and locating waste
materials that are not specifically nuclear. Ghose et al. (2006) use a geographic information system
(GIS) optimal routing model to obtain a solution that minimizes the cost and distance of transport-
ing solid wastes to a landfill. The Asansol Municipality Corporation in India can save 16.6 million
rupees or about $300,000 in annual operating costs. Tung & Pinnoi (2000) create a mixed-integer
program to optimize vehicle routing and scheduling for waste collection in Hanoi, Vietnam. They
show improvements in total cost and the number of vehicles utilized compared to previous routing
and scheduling techniques.
A related study by Leao et al. (2001) uses Monte Carlo simulation to model the effects of
population growth, urban sprawl, and waste generation on land supply. The study gives decision
makers a better idea of the relationship between waste management and urban development to help
decide where to dispose of solid waste material. Erkut & Neuman (1992) develop a multiobjective,
mixed-integer program that minimizes the total cost of undesirable waste facilities and the total
opposition to the facilities while maximizing the disutility imposed on an individual. They provide
a realistic example that examines the tradeoffs between the objectives. Angilella et al. (2015) apply
the Non Additive Robust Ordinal Regression method to determine the best urban landfill location
based on population presence, hydrogeological risk, possible transport infrastructure interferences,
and economic cost.
Multiple objectives can increase the flexibility of waste material location and routing opti-
mization models. Alumur & Kara (2007) develop a multiobjective location-routing mixed integer
programming model that determines where to open treatment and disposal centers for hazardous
waste, as well as how to route the waste to those centers. They successfully apply their model
to the Central Anatolian Region of Turkey. Giannikos (1998) develops a multiobjective model
to locate hazardous waste disposal or treatment facilities and to transport the waste, considering
four objectives: (i) minimize total operating cost; (ii) minimize total perceived risk; (iii) distribute
risk equally among population centers; and (iv) distribute the negative utility incurred by operating
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treatment facilities equally.
Some nuclear waste disposal research focuses on where to place a potential repository. Taji
et al. (2005) use multiple criteria decision analysis to determine potential repositories for nuclear
waste disposal. Weighted preferences evaluate safety and environmental concerns, relative cost,
and robustness; the combination of associated solutions yield an overall score for each repository.
Additional research focuses on the best type of disposal option for nuclear waste. Filbert et al.
(2008) outline a new nuclear waste disposal technique which places canisters into deep vertical
boreholes instead of placing them horizontally into a repository. Their goal is to optimize trans-
port, handling, and disposal efforts relative to horizontal waste placement. Jin (1994) explores the
optimal strategy for multimedia waste disposal. The primary decision is whether to dispose of
waste in the ocean or on land, the latter of which is more financially burdensome. He finds that the
optimal strategy based on moderate risk aversion is to use land-based facilities for waste disposal.
Mohr & O’Brien (1973) develop a generalized economic model to optimize a multi-source,
variably distributed system for waste disposal. A decision map shows an optimal plan for different
methods of deep-well disposal of liquid wastes. Similarly, Crowe et al. (2002) improve the accu-
racy and amount of information collected for maintenance of facilities where low-level radioactive
waste is disposed, specifically, at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). A probabilistic extension of the
NTS maintenance model allows the authors to incorporate uncertainty in input parameters such as
inventory, transportation, and exposure to radioactive material.
There is limited research regarding optimizing nuclear waste disposal processes using opera-
tions research techniques, and none specifically on how to optimize placement of nuclear waste
within a repository once the location of repository has been selected. Hutchinson (1983) develops
a linear programming model for the United Kingdom that optimizes at-sea disposal of radioac-
tive waste from all supply streams, subject to operational and political constraints. Rautman et al.
(1993) also use a linear programming model to minimize the total land area required to absorb and
dissipate the heat from the nuclear waste planned for disposal in Yucca Mountain. They find that
the size of Yucca Mountain is 17% too small to achieve optimal heat absorption and dissipation
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based on the amount of waste planned for placement. Our research addresses an important segment
of nuclear industry operations, that of waste disposal placement.
2.4 Mathematical Model (P)
There are several important objectives in nuclear waste disposal operations: (i) minimize the ra-
diation dose received by the workers; (ii) minimize the absolute deviation from the average worker
exposure; (iii) minimize the maximum worker exposure; (iv) minimize cost; and (v) minimize
placement time. Although our model has the ability to incorporate each of these objectives, place-
ment operations at Yucca Mountain were to be completely automated, limiting the applicability
of minimizing radiation exposure to workers. Therefore, we minimize heat load concentration
throughout the repository by implementing three different objective functions independently.
Three objectives provide different methods to minimize heat load concentration in the repos-
itory based on the six different classifications of waste packages, each of which has a different
heat load. Objective (2.1) minimizes the total weighted heat load of all 3-waste-package×3-waste-
package segments, which reduces hot spots in the repository by limiting the amount of high-heat-
load waste packages placed in close proximity to other high-heat-load waste packages. Objective
(2.2) minimizes the total difference from the average drift heat load, reducing the number of drifts
that have either an extremely high or extremely low heat load compared to the other drifts. Ob-
jective (2.3) minimizes the total difference from the overall average 3-waste-package×3-waste-
package segment weighted target heat load, which represents a slightly more complex method to
reduce hot spots in the repository. Other objective functions can also be implemented to reduce
heat load concentration, which, in some cases, might provide a more desirable solution (e.g., min-
imizing the maximum drift heat load).
The purpose of these three objective functions is to reduce heat load hot spots within the repos-
itory. The total heat load of the waste packages is constant regardless of their placement location
so we analyze segments within the repository to depict the local effect of neighboring waste pack-
ages’ heat load concentrations. A 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment is a 3×3 section of
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the repository that consists of nine slots across three drifts with a target slot located at its center.
We also implement the deviation from the average heat load in Objectives (2.2) and (2.3) to reduce
local heat load concentrations across the entire repository, which ensures that each segment is not
evaluated independently, but rather, in conjunction with all of the other local heat load concentra-
tions.
Figure 2.8 shows an example of how 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segments are repre-
sented in the repository. The first term determines the number of segments that are needed based
on the total number of drifts (|D |). The second term determines the number of segments that are
needed based on the number of slots per drift (|S |/|D |). A value of two is subtracted from each of
these terms because of boundary effects. If there are 10 drifts and 100 slots, the total number of
3-waste-package×3-waste-package segments is (10−2) · (100/10−2) = 64.









Figure 2.8: Sample 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segments
Figures 2.9-2.11 show how each objective function is calculated for waste packages placed us-
ing the sequential filling method; this figure does not represent an optimal solution. For simplicity,
the following heat load values are unweighted; the weighting scheme used in Objectives (2.1) and
(2.3) is discussed in Section 2.6. The first 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment in Objec-
tives (2.1) and (2.3) is shaded gray and the second 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment is
depicted by the thick black border. The four drifts for Objective (2.2) are represented by the gray
shading and thick black borders. The heat load values of the target slots for Objectives (2.1) and
(2.3) are depicted in boldface font.
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The heat load of the first 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment in Figure 2.9 is 16.8 kW
and the heat load for the second segment is 10.4 kW. The total heat load of all 3-waste-package×3-
waste-package segments is 27.2 kW (16.8 + 10.4). The average drift heat load in Figure 2.10 is
4.75 kW. The difference from the average heat load in a drift is 3.85 kW for Drift 1, 2.15 kW
for Drift 2, 0.850 kW for Drift 3, and 2.55 kW for Drift 4. The total difference from the average
drift heat load is 9.40 kW (3.85 + 2.15 + 0.850 + 2.55). The total heat load of all waste packages
in Figure 2.11 is 19.0 kW and the heat load for each of the 3-waste-package×3-waste-package
segments is the same as in Figure 2.9. The average 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment
target heat load is 9.50 kW. The difference from the average 3-waste-package×3-waste-package
segment target heat load is 7.30 kW for the first segment and 0.900 kW for the second segment.
The total difference from the overall average 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment target







Drift 1 4.0 4.0 0.6
Drift 2 0.6 1.0 1.0
Drift 3 1.0 0.6 4.0
Drift 4 1.0 0.6 0.6







Drift 1 4.0 4.0 0.6
Drift 2 0.6 1.0 1.0
Drift 3 1.0 0.6 4.0
Drift 4 1.0 0.6 0.6
Figure 2.10: Example of Objective (2.2) (heat load in kW)
The model incorporates various constraints imposed by the design and functionality of the
repository: (i) heat load limitations for the repository, (ii) location and time at which waste pack-
ages can be placed in the repository, and (iii) the number of waste packages that must be placed








Drift 1 4.0 4.0 0.6
Drift 2 0.6 1.0 1.0
Drift 3 1.0 0.6 4.0
Drift 4 1.0 0.6 0.6
Figure 2.11: Example of Objective (2.3) (heat load in kW)
Sets
w ∈W Waste package w
c ∈ C Waste package classification c
w ∈ Ŵc Waste package w within waste package classification c
s ∈S Drift slot s
s′ ∈S ′s Slot s′ within the 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment of target slot s
d ∈D Repository drift d
s ∈ Ŝd Slot s within repository drift d
t ∈T Time period t
Parameters
Heat Load
Qcw Heat load of waste package w within waste package classification c (watts)
Q̄2 Average heat load for all drifts (Objective 2) (watts)
Q̄3 Target heat load for all 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segments (Objective 3)
(watts)
δs Heat load weighting factor on drift slot s (unitless)
Demand
NTc Number of waste packages of classification c that must be disposed of in the repository,
invariant by time period
NCt Number of waste packages that must be disposed of in the repository in time period t,
invariant by waste package classification
Length
Lc Length of waste package of classification c (meters)
L̃d Maximum length of each drift d (meters)
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(|D |−2) · ((|S |/|D |)−2)
Variables
Difference Variables
Z2+d Positive difference from the average drift heat load for target drift d (Objective 2) (watts)
Z2−d Negative difference from the average drift heat load for target drift d (Objective 2) (watts)
Z3+s Positive difference from the average 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment
weighted target heat load for target slot s (Objective 3) (watts)
Z3−s Negative difference from the average 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment




1 if waste package w is disposed of in drift slot s during time period t
0 otherwise
Objectives













δs′ ·Qcw · yws′t
]
(2.1)









Objective 3: Minimize the total difference from the average 3-waste-package×3-waste-package











Variables within the model are subject to:






















δs′ ·Qcw · yws′t
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ywst ≥ NCt ∀ t ∈T (2.11)
Non-Negativity and Binary







s ≥ 0 ∀ d ∈D ,s ∈S (2.13)
Description
Objective (2.1) minimizes the total weighted heat load of all 3-waste-package×3-waste-
package segments in the repository. Objectives (2.2) and (2.3) minimize the absolute difference
from an average heat load. This construct is nonlinear because of the absolute value term in the
objective function. To linearize the model, the absolute difference is split into positive and negative
terms to incorporate values above and below the average heat load, respectively.
18
Parameter Q̄2 accounts for the average drift heat load. The total difference from the average drift
heat load, determined in Constraints (2.4), equals the difference between the average heat load and
the actual heat load for each drift. Parameter Q̄3 accounts for the average 3-waste-package×3-
waste-package segment target heat load. The target heat load is calculated in a manner similar to
that of Q̄2 because overlapping segments are not used in the calculations. The target heat load is the
quotient of the total heat load of the waste packages and the total number of segments, as opposed
to the quotient of the heat load of all the segments summed individually (including overlap) and
the total number of segments. The target heat load is not dependent on the arrangement of the
waste packages, which is beneficial because it provides a constant value against which to compare
each segment’s heat load. Using the target heat load is valid because, although it does not directly
depict the average 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment heat load, it does indicate the local
average heat load of the waste packages without double-counting heat loads within the segments.
The total difference from the average 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment weighted target
heat load, determined in Constraints (2.5), equals the difference between the target heat load and
the actual heat load for each segment.
Constraints are necessary to force the waste packages to be placed in a logical manner. Con-
straints (2.6) ensure that a waste package can only be placed in a drift slot if the previous slot
within the drift is already filled. Constraints (2.7) ensure that the total length of waste packages
placed in a drift does not exceed the maximum length of the drift. Constraints (2.8) enforce a drift
slot to be filled only once and Constraints (2.9) enforce a waste package to be placed only once.
Two different sets of demand constraints enforce placement quantity requirements which are
determined by government or repository management criteria. Constraints (2.10) ensure that the
demand for each waste package classification is met to prevent all of the waste packages in a
particular classification from being placed in the same time period. Constraints (2.11) ensure




Using the base model (Model (P) with no performance enhancements), we only can solve prob-
lem instances with fewer than 100 waste packages in 10 drifts, which is a fraction of a realistic
problem instance. We implement various performance enhancements to solve larger problem in-
stances more quickly. In particular, we employ existing symmetry reduction techniques, described
in Section 2.6.1, and utilize a high-quality initial solution, provided by a heuristic tailored specifi-
cally for our application, to solve larger problem instances.
2.5.1 Mathematical Model (P0)
A modified mixed integer program constitutes part of the time-independent placement heuristic
discussed in Section 2.5.2. The primary difference between this model, Model (P0), and Model (P)
is the removal of the time period index on the variables. Model (P0) requires all of the parameters
from Model (P), in addition to the new parameters given below. Objective (2.14) is modified from
Objective (2.1) to reflect this new paradigm; Objectives (2.2) and (2.3) are changed in the same
manner but, for the sake of brevity, are not shown.
Sets (Additional)
t ′ ∈T ′ Time period t ′
Parameters (Additional)
Sd First slot within drift d
Sd Last slot within drift d




Earliest time period for the placement of the waste package in the previous slot of drift d
Nc Number of waste packages of classification c that must be disposed of in the repository






























w∈W |TWw =t ′
yws ≥ 1 ∀ t ′ ∈T ′ (2.15)
∑
w∈W |TWw =t ′
yws ≥ ∑
w∈W |TWw =t ′
yw,s−1 ∀ t ′ ∈T ′,d ∈D ,












Lc · yws ≤ L̃d ∀ d ∈D (2.18)
∑
w∈W
yws ≤ 1 ∀ s ∈S (2.19)
∑
s∈S










yws ≥ NC (2.22)
yws binary ∀ w ∈W ,s ∈S (2.23)
Description
Two new constraint sets ensure precedence is maintained in Model (P), even though there are
no placement time periods in Model (P0). We use space as a proxy for the temporal precedence
that needs to be enforced in Model (P). Constraints (2.15) force each time period to be represented
at least once by the earliest placement time of a waste package in the first slot of a drift, and ensure
that placement demand for each time period can be met when time periods are later assigned to the
solution from Model (P0). Constraints (2.16) force the next NCt ′ − 1 number of slots within each
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drift to contain waste packages that have an earliest placement time no later than that of the waste
package in the slot before it. These constraints ensure that precedence is enforced for the number of
slots within a drift equal to the waste package placement demand for that time period and assume
that the placement demand for each time period is less than the number of slots in a drift. If these
two constraint sets are not present, the waste package placement schedule might not be possible
when time periods are assigned because the first slots in a drift might contain waste packages that
have late earliest placement times, which precludes the assignment of early time periods to slots
in that drift due to temporal precedence. Constraints (2.17) enforce spatial precedence and are
the same as Constraints (2.6) in Model (P) with the time index dropped. Constraints (2.18)-(2.23)
correspond to Constraints (2.7)-(2.12) in Model (P).
2.5.2 Time-Independent Placement Heuristic
The time-independent placement heuristic provides an initial solution to Model (P) for all ob-
jectives (Algorithm 1). Solving Model (P0) provides an assignment of waste packages to specific
slots. Time periods are then assigned to each waste package-slot placement in any valid arrange-
ment that is subject to precedence, waste package placement demand, and waste package avail-
ability. As long as the time is greater than or equal to the earliest placement time of the waste
package in the slot before it, we assign each slot the earliest placement time of the waste package
in the slot. Otherwise, a slot is assigned the earliest placement time corresponding to that of the
waste package placed in the previous slot. Then, Model (P) is solved with the result from Model
(P0) used as an initial solution; this dramatically reduces the solution time of the model, which
includes the time required to obtain the initial solution and to solve the model. A similar technique
is used in the mining industry in which the ultimate pit limit, analogous to Model (P0), is used as
a preprocessing tool for the open-pit mine production scheduling model, analogous to Model (P)
(Chicoisne et al., 2012; Espinoza et al., 2013; Lambert & Newman, 2014; Lerchs & Grossmann,
1965).
22
Algorithm 1 Time-Independent Placement Heuristic Pseudocode
Note: y0wst is an initial solution for Model (P)
1: procedure RUN FILE(Model)
2: if Model (P0) then
3: if Scenario 1 then
4: Drop Constraints (2.15) and (2.16)
5: Solve Model (P0)⇒ y∗ws
6: else if Model (P) then
7: Let ywst = y0wst ∀ w ∈W ,s ∈S , t ∈T
8: Solve Model (P)⇒ y∗wst
9: procedure JOB FILE
10: RUN FILE(Model (P0))
11: if Scenario 1 then








14: for w ∈W ,s ∈S do
15: if y∗ws = 1 then
16: Fix y0wst = y
∗
ws
17: for w ∈W ,s ∈S , t ∈T do
18: if y∗ws = 1 and ∑
t′∈T
y0
wst′ = 0 then
19: Fix y0wst = y
∗
ws
20: else if Scenario 2 then
21: for w ∈W ,d ∈D ,s ∈ Ŝd | s = Sd , t ∈T | t = T Ww do
22: if y∗ws = 1 then
23: Fix y0wst = y
∗
ws





25: for d ∈D ,s ∈ Ŝd | Sd +1≤ s≤ Sd ,w ∈W do
26: if y∗ws = 1 then

















32: RUN FILE(Model (P))
Two primary scenarios depict waste package availability. Scenario 1: there are enough waste
packages initially available for placement over the five-year time horizon; this allows the model
to be solved with no time restrictions on which waste packages can be placed in a specific slot
during the time horizon. Constraints (2.15) and (2.16) are dropped for Scenario 1 because temporal
precedence does not matter. Scenario 2: there are time restrictions on when waste packages are
available for placement, which makes the model harder to solve because even though the number
of variables is reduced, precedence constraints must still be satisfied in the presence of limited
placement opportunities over the time horizon. Operations at Yucca Mountain are more likely
to resemble those represented in Scenario 2 because waste packages would probably arrive on a
yearly basis with limitations on the earliest and latest time periods for waste package placement.
23
Section 2.7 contains results for each objective-scenario combination.
2.5.3 Sliding Time Horizon Heuristic
The size of the repository is too large to obtain an operational lifetime placement scheme in
a single solve. Therefore, we segment the repository into sizes reasonable for operational imple-
mentation; for Yucca Mountain, we use ten drifts with 85 slots per drift, and five time periods.
After one segment is solved, the placement schedule can be fixed and the model can be resolved
to obtain another five-year placement schedule. An alternative is to utilize a sliding time horizon
heuristic that yields a placement scheme with “look-ahead,” e.g., solve for ten years, fix the place-
ment schedule for the first five years, solve for the next ten years, fix the schedule for the second
five years, etc. (Brown et al., 2001; Pochet & Wolsey, 2006).
2.5.4 Hardware and Software
We use the modeling language AMPL, Version 20130109 (AMPL Optimization LLC, 2013;
Fourer et al., 2003) and solver CPLEX Version 12.6.0.1 with default settings (IBM, 2014; IBM
ILOG AMPL, 2010) on a Dell PowerEdge R410 workstation under the Ubuntu 14.04 operating
system with four Quad core CPUs running at 2.72 GHz with 28 GB RAM and a 160 GB HDD.
2.6 Data
Yucca Mountain was planned to have a total of 18,360 slots, 108 drifts, and 54 time periods
with a fidelity of one year. We present results for a repository segment of ten drifts over a time
horizon of five years, which reflects the concurrent development and placement plan for Yucca
Mountain operations. The number of waste packages varies from 50 to 850. The largest model
instance presented in this paper, 850 slots and 10 drifts, which corresponds to 85 slots per drift,
includes half of the maximum available 170 slots per drift; we assume a drift is only filled with the
shortest-length waste packages because there are no predetermined slots within the drifts.
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2.6.1 Symmetry Reduction
There are six waste package classifications in Yucca Mountain: transportation, aging, and dis-
posal (TAD), Department of Energy (DOE) short (DOE S), DOE long (DOE L), high-level waste
(HLW), Naval short (Naval S), and Naval long (Naval L). The number of waste packages of each
classification represents the expected number of waste packages arriving at Yucca Mountain. Ta-
ble 2.2 shows the average heat load, length and placement demand values for each waste package
classification.
In its original version, the model possesses significant symmetry. In the absence of actual heat
load values, we use average heat loads, which yield identical values for each waste package classi-
fication. In addition, waste packages can be placed in different time period-slot combinations that
are mirror images of each other. Symmetry reduction, introduced via perturbations and symmetry
breaking constraints, creates distinctions between parameter values within the objective functions
and constraints, which allows the solver to avoid alternative symmetric solutions.
Table 2.2: Waste package average heat load, length, and quantity data
Classification TAD DOE S DOE L HLW Naval S Naval L
Heat Load (W) 601 2,640 4,010 1,440 11,800 11,800
Length (m) 5.85 3.7 5.3 5.28 5.22 5.85
Demand (packages) 7,500 1,750 1,750 2,823 90 310
Individual heat loads are not known because no waste has been scheduled to be shipped to Yucca
Mountain, so average heat load values for each of the waste package classifications are used (Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission, 2008). In addition, waste packages can be placed in different time
period-slot combinations that are mirror images of each other. These attributes cause significant
symmetry. Symmetry reduction, introduced via perturbations and symmetry breaking constraints,
creates distinctions between parameter values within the objective functions and constraints, which
allows the solver to avoid alternative symmetric solutions.
Specifically, heat load perturbations make every waste package’s heat load unique; this provides
useful distinctions between parameter values without changing the optimal solution. We follow the
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guidelines presented in Geoffrion & Nauss (1977) to ensure that the perturbations do not change
the optimal solution. Perturbations are added to the heat load in the difference constraints for
Objective (2.2) to further distinguish individual heat loads within drifts.
Symmetry breaking constraints can be implemented based on waste package, slot, or time pe-
riod. The added constraints place an artificial precedence on a particular variable index. We im-
plement waste package symmetry reduction constraints, i.e., y1st ≥ y2st ≥ y3st , which give priority
to variables y1st over variables y2st and y2st over y3st (Sherali & Smith, 2001). This is important
because all waste packages within a specific classification have the same characteristics, such as
length and heat load. Placing artificial precedence on waste packages for a given slot-time period
combination helps the solver identify a difference between the waste packages, which reduces the
solution time when used with Objective (2.1). Solution times are not decreased by symmetry re-
duction constraints for the models containing Objectives (2.2) and (2.3), which have an absolute
difference construct. Alternate symmetry breaking constraints based on slot and/or time period did
not yield solution time improvements.
2.6.2 Heat Load Weighting Factors
Figure 2.12 shows the heat load weighting factor δs′ based on the position of slot s
′ relative to
the target slot s. The slots adjacent to the target slot (in the same drift) are weighted as 1 to reflect
that there is almost no change in heat load concentration because of the close proximity and lack
of barriers between the slots. The slots directly horizontal to the target slot (in different drifts) are
weighted as 0.5 to reflect the decrease in heat transferred from the target slot to the slots in the
neighboring drifts because of the added distance and the drift wall barrier. The corner slots of the
3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment are weighted as 0.25 to reflect the decrease in heat
transfer because of the drift wall barrier and even further distance from the target slot. If desired,
















Figure 2.12: Heat load weighting factors, δs′ , for adjacent slots s
′ relative to target slot s
2.7 Numerical Results
Heat load and solution speed results for each objective are presented for both scenarios dis-
cussed in Section 2.5.2, incorporated independently for each objective. The model also has the
capability to add restrictions on the earliest and latest time periods that slots are available to re-
ceive waste packages and to limit certain waste packages to be placed only in certain slots. The
earliest placement times indicate when waste packages will arrive on-site. The DOE also has con-
cerns about how long high-heat-load waste packages remain on-site without being disposed of; this
is addressed by the latest placement time period capability of the model. All of the waste packages
that arrive during the time horizon are known at the beginning of the horizon. The solution times
from the model with performance enhancements for each objective are compared with solution
times from the base model (no performance enhancements) to show the improvements from the
added enhancements.
2.7.1 Heat Load Results
Objective function values are the same for both scenarios discussed in Section 2.5.2 because
the optimal waste package placement is not heavily dependent on arrival times. The greedy and
sequential filling methods give an 18.34% and a 17.57% higher total weighted heat load of all
3-waste-package×3-waste-package segments (Objective (2.1)), an 873% and a 701% higher total
difference from the average drift heat load (Objective (2.2)), and a 28.44% and 27.27% higher total
difference from the overall average 3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment weighted target
heat load (Objective (2.3)) compared to the optimal filling method, respectively.
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Greedy Method




segments = 1.99 MW
• 18.3% higher than the
optimal method
Sequential Method




segments = 1.98 MW
• 17.6% higher than the
optimal method
Optimal Method




segments = 1.68 MW
Figure 2.13: Graphical results of each filling method for Objective (2.1). Cell data represents
disposal time period.
Unexpectedly, the greedy filling method provides a worse objective value than the sequential
filling method for all three objectives. Intuitively, the former method appears to be a better option
to reduce heat load concentration in the repository than the latter method because it places waste
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packages in the lowest total heat load drift. However, the greedy method does not consider heat
load impacts on neighboring drifts, i.e., cross-drifts, which might inadvertently be addressed better
by the sequential method.
Greedy Method
• Total difference from
the average drift heat
load = 0.09 MW
• 873% higher than the
optimal method
Sequential Method
• Total difference from
the average drift heat
load = 0.07 MW
• 701% higher than the
optimal method
Optimal Method
• Total difference from
the average drift heat
load = 0.01 MW
Figure 2.14: Graphical results of each filling method for Objective (2.2). Cell data represents
disposal time period.
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The highest-heat-load waste packages are placed on the edges in the optimal result for Objec-
tives (2.1) and (2.3). (Figure 2.13 presents the results for Objective (2.1); a figure is not presented
for Objective (2.3) because the results for each non-optimal filling method are exactly the same as
those for Objective (2.1), and the results for the optimal filling method are visually similar. This
result occurs because both Objectives (2.1) and (2.3) minimize some form of weighted heat load,
which drives the solution behavior; it also indicates that the solution is robust because although
the structures of the objective functions are very different, they give a similar waste package place-
ment scheme.) This is expected due to the lower heat load weighting factors on the edges of each
3-waste-package×3-waste-package segment and the reduced number of times that those waste
packages are counted toward the objective. Placing higher heat load waste packages along the
edge of the repository is desired in actual applications because the effect of high heat load on other
waste packages is reduced on the edges where there are fewer waste packages. Also, there is more
natural shielding along the edges of the repository, which helps negate high heat load effects out-
side of the drifts. Constraints can be added to force high heat load waste packages further from the
boundary.
Even though there is no visible reduction in heat load between the filling methods seen in
Figure 2.14 for Objective (2.2), the optimal filling method is better at ensuring that each drift has
approximately the same total heat load. This objective is very applicable when there is adequate
shielding between drifts that will mostly negate cross-drift heat load effects. Constraints can be
added to increase the distance between high heat load waste packages within a drift. Overall, each
of these methods for minimizing heat load concentration improves upon the sequential and greedy
filling methods.
2.7.2 Solution Speed Results
The base model for all objectives does not incorporate symmetry reduction constraints, per-
turbations, or the time-independent placement heuristic. The best (most efficient) model for all
objectives incorporates perturbations on the waste package heat loads, perturbations in the dif-
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ference constraints for Objective (2.2), symmetry reduction constraints on the waste packages for
Objective (2.1), and the time-independent placement heuristic for all objectives. The solution times
for various model sizes, based on the number of waste packages, are shown in Table 2.3. If a prob-
lem instance cannot be solved within the time limit, its gap is shown in parenthesis. In some cases,
the initial solution (obtained from Model (P0)) cannot be identified within the time limit, and we
report its gap and terminate the run.
Table 2.3: Solution times (in seconds) for each objective, scenario, and problem instance.
Scenario 1: Shaded; Scenario 2: Unshaded
A : Solutions given in Figures 2.13 and 2.14, respectively
Number of waste packages
50 60 70 80 90 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 850
Base 6 6 8 14 22 25 560 2225 1530 (6.17) (6.48) (10.3) ∼ ∼
Best 2 2 3 4 5 6 33 95 317 651 1934 3731 4050 5343
Base 1 3 2 4 5 8 51 429 561 3789 ∼ ∼ ∼ ∼
Objective (2.1)
Best 2 3 3 3 5 7 25 77 206 433 916 1621 2787 9267
Base 861 287 (25) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) ∼ ∼ ∼ ∼ ∼
Best (43.9) (72.5) (71.0) (13.6)∗ (40.0)∗ (7.73)∗ 205 130 274 534 860 1815 1983 3251
Base 9 28 450 (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) ∼ ∼ ∼ ∼ ∼
Objective (2.2)
Best 3218 (34.3) (52.7)∗ (18.2)∗ (40.9)∗ (23.3)∗ 133 131 325 757 1169 1891 5469 4737
Base 8 7 8 9 15 20 174 701 3055 ∼ ∼ ∼ ∼ ∼
Best 6 5 5 6 9 10 42 123 254 557 1255 1973 2570 4070
Base 8 4 5 7 9 12 95 551 1469 4436 ∼ ∼ ∼ ∼
Objective (2.3)
Best 8 4 5 6 7 9 44 134 345 682 1340 2196 4245 6154
Greedy
method
Best 1 1 1 2 3 4 22 91 142 346 587 863 1237 1584
Sequential
method
Best 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 5 9 12 19 23 30 40
Time limit = 10,000 seconds; ∼ : No integer solution within time limit
(%) : Model (P) gap; (%)∗ : Model (P0) gap
The performance enhancements incorporated in the model increase the solvable model size and
decrease the solution time for all problem instances with the exception of a few smaller instances
associated with Objective (2.2). Restrictions on the availability of waste packages increase the
solution time because, although the number of variables decreases, precedence constraints must
still be satisfied in the presence of limited placement opportunities over the time horizon, which
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increases the difficulty of the problem. For Objective (2.2), the solvable model size increases by
an order of magnitude.
Small problem instances for both scenarios in Objective (2) have long solution times because
the relative difference between the magnitude of the perturbations and the other values in the con-
straints does not provide enough symmetry reduction to obtain solution speed improvements. We
can combat this by increasing the magnitude of the perturbations; however, to maintain unifor-
mity, we use a constant perturbation magnitude that is ideal for the larger sized models. The
time-independent placement heuristic is the greatest contributor to increased performance.
2.8 Conclusion
We develop a mixed integer program that creates an optimal, reproducible schedule for nuclear
waste placement, using the Yucca Mountain repository in Nevada as a case study. The optimal
solution determines where to place each waste package of a specific type in a given time period
with the goal of minimizing heat load concentration within a repository. This research can be
applied to any of the repositories planned for operation around the world with slight modifications
to incorporate site-specific objectives and constraints.
Three different objectives minimize heat load concentration in the repository, which increases
the flexibility and effectiveness of the model for use at other deep geologic repositories with the
same goals. Existing filling methods give at least a 17% to an 873% higher, i.e., worse, heat load
concentration in the repository with respect to these objectives than do optimal methods. The per-
formance enhancements incorporated in the model increase the solvable model size and decrease
the solution time for all problem instances with the exception of a few smaller instances associ-
ated with Objective (2.2). The time-independent placement heuristic is the greatest contributor to
increased performance.
Our model is also able to incorporate other objectives that are important in nuclear waste dis-
posal operations, such as: (i) minimize the radiation dose received by workers; (ii) minimize the
absolute deviation from the average worker exposure; (iii) minimize the maximum worker expo-
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sure; (iv) minimize cost; and (v) minimize placement time. Incorporating multiple objectives into
the model allows a repository to obtain a solution that considers multiple goals.
A possible extension to this research is to optimize the entire process of nuclear waste transport
from a reactor to permanent disposal in a repository. This includes transportation from a reactor
location to interim storage, placement in the interim storage facility, and transportation from the
interim storage facility to a permanent repository. The final piece is the optimization of waste
placement within a permanent deep geologic repository, which is addressed in this research.
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OPTIMALLY CONFIGURING A MEASUREMENT SYSTEM TO DETECT DIVERSIONS
FROM A NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
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3.1 Abstract
The civilian nuclear fuel cycle is an industrial process that produces electrical power from nu-
clear fission of uranium. Using a measurement system to accurately account for nuclear material,
such as uranium, in a fuel cycle is important because of the possible loss or diversion (i.e., theft)
of this potentially dangerous material. A measurement system is defined by a set of measurement
methods, or “devices,” used to account for material flows and inventory values at specific locations
in the fuel cycle. We develop a simulation-optimization algorithm and an integer-programming
model to find the best, or near-best, resource-limited measurement system with a high degree of
confidence. The simulation-optimization algorithm minimizes a weighted sum of false positive
and false negative diversion-detection probabilities while accounting for material quantities and
measurement errors across a finite, discrete time horizon in hypothetical non-diversion and diver-
sion contexts. In each time period, the estimated cumulative material unaccounted for is compared
to a fixed or an optimized threshold value to assess if a “significant amount of material” is lost from
a measurement system. The integer-programming model minimizes the population variance of the
estimated material loss, i.e., material unaccounted for, in a measurement system. We analyze three
potential problems in nuclear fuel cycle measurement systems: (i) given location-dependent device
precisions, find the configuration of n devices at n locations (n=3) that gives the lowest correspond-
ing objective values using the simulation-optimization algorithm and integer-programming model,
5Primary researcher and author, PhD Candidate, Operations Research with Engineering Program, Colorado School of
Mines
6Professor, Operations Research with Engineering Program, Colorado School of Mines
7Assistant Professor, Department of Applied Mathematics and Statistics, Colorado School of Mines
8Associate Professor, Nuclear Science and Engineering Program, Colorado School of Mines
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(ii) find the location at which improving device precision reduces objective values the most using
the simulation-optimization algorithm, and (iii) determine the effect of measurement frequency on
measurement system configurations and objective values using the simulation-optimization algo-
rithm. We obtain comparable results for each problem at least an order of magnitude faster than
existing methods. Using an optimized, rather than fixed, detection threshold in the simulation-
optimization algorithm reduces the weighted sum of false positive and false negative probabilities.
3.2 Introduction
The civilian nuclear fuel cycle is a set of industrial processes that utilize naturally occurring
uranium from the time it is mined as ore, converted into an energy source, and permanently dis-
posed underground after its energy value is depleted. Naturally occurring uranium contains 0.7%
uranium-235 by weight. The concentration of uranium-235 in nuclear fuel must be increased, or
enriched, to 3-5% uranium-235 by weight before the fuel material can be used for electricity pro-
duction. Enriched uranium is potentially dangerous because it could be used to produce nuclear
weapons (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002). It is imperative to closely monitor enriched
uranium as it progresses through a fuel cycle because of its possible loss or diversion (i.e., theft).
This paper describes the development of the NUclear Measurement System Optimization
(NUMSO) toolkit, which is composed of a simulation-optimization algorithm and an integer-
programming model that identify an optimal measurement system configuration with high con-
fidence. A measurement system is defined by a set of measurement methods, or “devices,” used to
account for material quantities at input, output, and inventory locations of one or more fuel cycle
facilities. A measurement system configuration is a unique, location-dependent arrangement of de-
vices based on the detection threshold and corresponding parameter settings. NUMSO optimizes
these configurations by identifying the one that yields the lowest weighted sum of false positive
and false negative probabilities or the lowest population variance of estimated material loss.
We analyze and enhance nuclear fuel cycle measurement systems because the loss and theft of
nuclear and other radioactive material is an international security concern (International Atomic
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Energy Agency, 2015). Nuclear material can be used to produce nuclear weapons while “other ra-
dioactive material” emits ionizing radiation but is not capable of a nuclear explosion (International
Atomic Energy Agency, 2002, 2007). From 1993-2014, there were 714 incidents of loss or theft
of nuclear and other radioactive material from facilities or during transport reported to the Incident
and Trafficking Database, most of which involved other radioactive materials from industrial or
medical applications. However, several incidents included high-enriched uranium, which, if ac-
cumulated in sufficient quantities, can be made into a nuclear weapon. These incidents indicate
that the loss of nuclear material is still a threat, which can be addressed by enhancing existing
measurement systems (Williams, 2014).
Several software programs exist that account for simulated nuclear material at various stages in
a fuel cycle (Cipiti & McDaniel, 2012; Cipiti & Zinaman, 2010a,b; Cipiti et al., 2011; Riley et al.,
2016; Wilkey & Whitty, 1995). In particular, Shugart & King (2016) develop the SafeGuards Anal-
ysis (SGA) toolbox to evaluate a measurement system by simulating measurements at a single fuel
cycle facility. SGA constructs a material balance equation from these measurements to identify
if there is apparent material loss, i.e., material unaccounted for (MUF). The estimated cumulative
material unaccounted for (CMUF) in a given time horizon is the estimated MUF accumulated over
all previous time periods. SGA models statistical tests (e.g., cumulative sum, exponential weighted
average) to determine if a single false positive or false negative error occurs in hypothetical diver-
sion contexts. Shugart & King (2016) use a Monte Carlo approach to replicate this SGA process
to estimate false positive and false negative error probabilities.
The software programs mentioned above only evaluate a single measurement system config-
uration per execution, which precludes the ability to quickly compare multiple configurations.
NUMSO identifies the optimal measurement system configuration with high confidence provided
a set of possible locations and devices in a single execution. Suzuki & Ihara (2008) introduce the
only other similar tool. They use linear programming to compare the trade-off between cost and
probability of detecting a hypothetical diversion of two specific measurement methods, destructive
and non-destructive analysis.
36
In this paper, we develop the Simulation Optimization Configuration Algorithm (SOCA) to
compare different measurement system configurations in simulated non-diversion and diversion
contexts across a finite, discrete time horizon. SOCA identifies with high confidence the mea-
surement system configuration that minimizes a weighted sum of false positive and negative error
probabilities obtained from a cumulative material unaccounted for test (CUMUF test). A false
positive error, i.e., Type I error, results from “falsely concluding that nuclear material has been
lost when in fact no material has been lost.” A false negative error, i.e., Type II error, results
from concluding that a material loss did not occur when it actually did occur (International Atomic
Energy Agency, 2002). A CUMUF test compares the estimated CMUF to a detection threshold
to decide if there is material loss. Beedgen (1988) also uses a CUMUF test in the Program for
Statistical Analysis software program to identify potential uranium loss from the Allied General
Nuclear Services Barnwell Nuclear Fuels Plant.
SOCA can implement either a pre-determined, fixed detection threshold or an optimized de-
tection threshold, i.e., a threshold that results in the lowest weighted sum of Type I and Type II
error probabilities. SOCA can also evaluate different statistical tests and hypothetical diversion
contexts. We completely enumerate all measurement system configurations in SOCA because of
the small scale of the system we analyze in this paper. However, to optimize a large system, we
might need heuristics such as simulated annealing (Kirkpatrick et al., 1983) or genetic algorithms
(Srinivas & Patnaik, 1994) to identify a good configuration.
We also develop the Minimum Variance Configuration Model (MVCM) in this paper to iden-
tify the measurement system configuration that minimizes the population variance of the estimated
MUF in a measurement system over a time horizon. Reducing measurement uncertainty enables
us to more accurately estimate true material quantities. The purpose of MVCM is to find a config-
uration that produces a weighted sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities comparable to that
from SOCA’s configuration. We show that MVCM obtains the same optimal configuration faster
than SOCA using a different objective and simpler modeling framework; we provide mathematical
justification of its properties in the appendix. Previously, Stewart (1970) finds how many measure-
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ments to take at each location at a hypothetical fuel cycle facility by approximately minimizing the
variance of the estimated MUF subject to a cost constraint. Bouchey et al. (1971) use a multi-stage
dynamic program to solve the same problem but without using Stewart’s variance approximation.
Rather than finding how many measurements to take at a location, we identify where to locate
measurements.
For testing, we analyze three problems from Shugart & King (2016): given location-dependent
device precisions, use SOCA and MVCM to optimize the configuration of n devices at n loca-
tions (n=3) (Problem 1), find the location at which improving device precision reduces objective
values the most with SOCA (Problem 2), and determine the effect of measurement frequency on
measurement system configurations and objective values with SOCA (Problem 3). Solving these
problems produces representative answers to potential questions in nuclear safeguards and gives a
basis for comparison to SGA (Shugart & King, 2016). To compare results, we use an example nu-
clear enrichment facility, which is detailed in Section 3.3.3 (Shugart & King, 2016; United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2016).
We reduce the computation time to find solutions to Problems 1-3 compared to SGA by us-
ing simulation-optimization and integer-programming techniques. SOCA eliminates the overhead
time SGA spends initializing each configuration. SGA uses “blocks,” i.e., independent groups of
computer code, to input data, perform calculations, and produce results. This requires additional
time to pass information between blocks and memory to store all of the required information the
blocks generate. By contrast, SOCA executes calculations and evaluates results as necessary, and
discards information as soon as possible to reduce computation time and memory requirements.
SOCA replicates the CUMUF test in parallel to further reduce computation time and provides so-
lutions with a pre-specified level of confidence. MVCM decreases the number of variables and
constraints required to find the same measurement system configuration by utilizing the relation-
ship between the population variance of the estimated MUF and the weighted sum of Type I and
Type II error probabilities. In addition, MVCM exploits a branch-and-bound algorithm to avoid
completely enumerating solutions (Land & Doig, 1960). Table 3.1 summarizes the models in
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MUF
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To the best of our knowledge, NUMSO is the first customizable toolkit that evaluates multiple,
feasible measurement system configurations in a single execution and identifies the best one with
high confidence. In addition, we are the first to employ an optimized detection threshold to reduce
the weighted sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities and to provide a measurement system
configuration heuristic based on minimizing the population variance of the estimated MUF to
further reduce the computation time for Problem 1.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 4.4 discusses relevant background ma-
terial including important definitions and key concepts related to nuclear safeguards; Section 3.4
contains preliminary technical information; in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, we detail SOCA and MVCM,
respectively; we present and analyze results in Section 4.6 and provide conclusions and discussion
of future work in Section 4.8.
3.3 Background
The International Atomic Energy Agency implements a group of activities, called nuclear safe-
guards, which try to ensure that its 140 member states are not using their civilian nuclear fuel cy-
cles to produce nuclear weapons (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2016). One type of nuclear
safeguard, material control and accountability (MC&A) attempts to prevent the illicit acquisition of
nuclear materials, such as enriched uranium, and the subsequent development of weapons, by de-
tecting and deterring the loss of these materials from within a nuclear fuel cycle (U.S. Department
of Energy, 2011). Material control tries to prevent the unapproved removal of nuclear materials
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from authorized locations or to detect their absence in a timely manner. Material accountabil-
ity ensures that there is an accurate record of material within nuclear fuel cycle facilities (U.S.
Department of Energy, 2011). Combined, these branches of MC&A establish the measurement
and inventory balance of nuclear material at one or more facilities (International Atomic Energy
Agency, 2002).
Measurements are the primary means to ensure that nuclear material is not lost from a facility;
thus, accountability measurements, which establish initial values of nuclear material, and verifi-
cation measurements, which authenticate the amount of material present, must be as precise as
possible. One of the primary objectives of MC&A is to provide material estimates that enable
detecting the loss or diversion of nuclear material despite uncertainties in those values (U.S. De-
partment of Energy, 2011). NUMSO identifies measurement system configurations that provide
accurate estimates of material quantities by (i) minimizing the weighted sum of Type I error proba-
bilities for a specific diversion or non-diversion context and (ii) minimizing the population variance
of the estimated MUF.
3.3.1 Nuclear Fuel Cycle
To further understand MC&A and its role in safeguarding nuclear material, we describe the
primary stages of the current nuclear fuel cycle in the United States: mining and milling, conver-
sion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor power production, spent fuel management, reprocessing
(when appropriate), and final disposal. Natural uranium is mined from the ground as ore with ap-
proximate isotope concentrations of 0.006 atomic percent (at.%) uranium-234, 0.72 at.% uranium-
235, and 99.27 at.% uranium-238 (Smith Jr, 1991). The uranium is milled, usually on-site, into
uranium oxide concentrate, also known as “yellowcake,” and then transported to a conversion facil-
ity where it is processed into uranium hexafluoride. The uranium-235 in the uranium hexafluoride
is then enriched to 3.5-5.0 at.%. Enriched uranium is generally required to generate nuclear power,
and highly enriched uranium (>20 at.% uranium-235) is needed to make nuclear weapons.
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After enrichment, the uranium is converted back into uranium oxide and formed into ceramic
pellets. Fuel rods, i.e., metal tubes packed with ceramic pellets, are arranged into an assembly that
comprises part of a reactor core along with several hundred other assemblies. A chain reaction
occurs when the uranium-235 fissions, or splits, which heats the water surrounding the fuel rods.
The hot water becomes steam, which drives a turbine and generator to produce electricity (World
Nuclear Association, 2016a).
Used fuel from the reactor, i.e., a collection of fuel rods with depleted energy value, is placed
in a storage pond to reduce the radiation levels and high heat content from radioactive decay. As
a storage pond approaches capacity, some of the older used fuel that has been cooling for at least
five years is put into dry casks and stockpiled above ground (United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 2015). The used fuel remains in storage ponds or dry casks for 40-50 years before
it is either reprocessed or permanently disposed. Several countries (including France, the United
Kingdom, and Germany) reprocess their used fuel, while other countries (such as Canada, Finland,
Sweden, and the United States) plan to permanently dispose of it. Canada and Finland intend
to start placing their waste in deep geologic repositories by 2025 and 2023, respectively (World
Nuclear Association, 2016b).
3.3.2 MC&A Measurement System
A measurement system is used to estimate material entering (i.e., receipts) and exiting (i.e.,
shipments) one or more nuclear fuel cycle facilities, in addition to deriving estimates for all batch
quantities of material present at each facility (i.e., physical inventory). The estimated MUF is the
difference between measured shipments and the sum of measured receipt and physical inventory
quantities. Even if no material is lost from the system, the estimated MUF is rarely zero because
of measurement errors.
It is necessary, therefore, to properly account for the errors that occur when measurements
are taken to assess the statistical significance of any differences between what is assumed to be
and what is found in a facility (U.S. Department of Energy, 2011). A random error is a positive
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or negative fluctuation from the true quantity that is caused by limitations to the precision of the
measurement device. A systematic error is a unidirectional bias that can be caused by improper use
or function of a measurement device resulting in a shift of the measurement from the true quantity.
To model random errors, we obtain SOCA samples from a uniform distribution associated with
each device to compare results with Shugart & King (2016). Many applications, however, use
normal distributions to model random measurement errors (Bronshtein & Semendyayev, 2015, p.
849); to maintain flexibility in SOCA, we allow distributions and their parameters (e.g., bounds,
mean, variance) to change depending on the properties of the actual devices utilized in a measure-
ment system. We omit systematic errors in our analysis for simplicity.
An MC&A system uses MBAs and key measurement points to identify boundaries and loca-
tions, respectively, at which measurements are taken. An MBA represents a facility or subset of a
facility provided that (1) the amount transferred into or out of the MBA can be quantified and (2)
the physical inventory within the MBA can be quantified “when necessary” (International Atomic
Energy Agency, 2002). For example, an MBA can be an entire enrichment facility or an individual
centrifuge. In practice, most facilities in a nuclear fuel cycle comprise a single MBA; however,
complex manufacturing and reprocessing plants might require two or more MBAs to adequately
model activities (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2008).
The ability to recognize a substantial material loss with high probability is required to establish
an MC&A system’s effectiveness (de Montmollin & Weinstock, 1979). We analyze a constant,
low-level diversion over an extended time horizon because, according to Burr (1994), this is a
worst-case loss context in terms of detection probability. To discover a hypothetical worst-case
material loss, we estimate CMUF because it may be difficult to detect small diversions with es-
timated MUF. Statistical tests typically use estimated CMUF to identify material loss (Beedgen,
1988; Leitner et al., 1987; Seifert, 1986).
SOCA evaluates a fixed-period CUMUF test because it yields the maximum detection proba-
bility against a worst-case loss context (Avenhaus & Jaech, 1981). SOCA evaluates this test over a
single time horizon, which is applicable because in practice, there are usually infrequent material
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balance evaluations, e.g., once per year (Burr & Hamada, 2013).
A potential problem with fixed-period tests is that a diversion can occur over multiple time
horizons. To address this, Burr & Hamada (2013) use two data-driven tests over multiple time
horizons: (i) MUF Shewhart and (ii) standardized, independently transformed MUF. SOCA is
able to evaluate these and other statistical tests discussed in Seifert (1986), Gale (1986), Leitner
et al. (1987), Beedgen (1988), Jacobson (1992), Burr & Hamada (2013), and Shugart & King
(2016).
SOCA uses a material balance equation to estimate the MUF M̃t and CMUF C̃t at the end
of each time period t during a finite, discrete time horizon T = {1, ...,T}. Measured receipts,
shipments, and physical inventory are random variables R̃t , S̃t , and Ĩt , respectively, because mea-
surements introduce random errors. We assume that Ĩ0 is the estimated inventory at the beginning
of t = 1.





M̃τ ∀ t ∈T (3.2)
We also assume that the length of the time horizon T is set according to timeliness detection
goal limits, which are used in conjunction with significant quantity limits to define the amount
of time and material required to signify a consequential diversion. We use a material loss of
significant quantity/timeliness goal in each period during the time horizon to represent a constant, low-level
diversion. The “target detection times applicable to specific nuclear material categories” define
timeliness goals. A significant quantity is “the approximate amount of nuclear material for which
the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.” Table 4.2 shows
the timeliness detection goal and significant quantity limits provided by the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the primary nuclear materials of concern in MC&A (International Atomic
Energy Agency, 2002).
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Table 3.2: Significant quantities of nuclear materials with their associated timeliness goals













High-enriched uranium Metal 1 month




(uranium-235 < 20 at.%)
Unirradiated fresh fuel
75 kg uranium-235, 10 metric
tons natural uranium, or 20
metric tons depleted uranium
1 year
Thorium Unirradiated fresh fuel 20 metric tons 1 year
3.3.3 Enrichment Facility Material Balance Area
We can model different types of nuclear fuel cycle facilities and evaluate the loss of different
nuclear materials with NUMSO. For example, we can use a uranium-oxide fuel fabrication or
production facility to evaluate uranium loss. To assess plutonium loss, we can model a mixed-
oxide fuel fabrication or conversion facility.
Figure 3.1 is a visual representation of material balance components at an example enrichment
facility, which is shown as a single MBA with a potential material loss stream and input, output,
tails, and cascade key measurement points.






Figure 3.1: An example enrichment facility MBA with a potential material loss stream and input,
output, tails, and cascade key measurement points
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In this example, uranium hexafluoride enters the MBA with naturally occurring uranium isotope
concentrations and leaves the MBA with a much higher concentration of uranium-235. The tails
stream contains depleted (<0.72 at.%) uranium-235 from the uranium enrichment process and
the inventory represents the batch quantity of material currently in the enrichment cascade, i.e.,
series of centrifuges used to enrich the uranium. We assume that the output stream is the most
likely location for a diversion to occur because it contains enriched uranium rather than unenriched
uranium present in the other streams. Table 3.3 shows approximate material quantities used in the
enrichment facility example.
Table 3.3: Example enrichment facility material quantities






SOCA uses a hypothesis test based on a discrete stochastic process to identify if there is
enough statistical evidence to indicate whether a constant, low-level hypothetical diversion oc-
curs. We assume that the true CMUF Ct is a non-random, but unknown, temporally indexed and
non-decreasing function. The non-exhaustive hypotheses are the null hypothesis H0 that there is
no material loss in any time period in the time horizon, and the alternate hypothesis H1 that the
quantity of material loss is greater than a fixed detection threshold λ > 0 at some time k in the
horizon.
H0 : Ct = 0 for all t = 1, . . . ,T (3.3)
H1 : Ct ≥ λ for t = k, . . . ,T for some 1≤ k ≤ T (3.4)
Type I and Type II error probabilities determine the effectiveness of a current or proposed
MC&A strategy (e.g., a new measurement system configuration) regarding the detection of a di-
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version. To test these hypotheses, we create a rejection rule C̃t ≥ λ . Under this rejection rule, a
Type I error occurs if C̃t ≥ λ for any t = 1, . . . ,T when Ct = 0 for all t = 1, . . . ,T , and a Type II
error occurs if C̃t < λ for all t = 1, . . . ,T when Ct ≥ λ , for t = k, . . . ,T for some 1 ≤ k ≤ T . We
denote the Type I and Type II error probabilities as α and β , respectively.
SOCA indicates that a hypothetical diversion likely occurs if the estimated CMUF exceeds the
detection threshold in any period during the time horizon. It is important to note, however, that
an actual diversion does not necessarily occur in practice even if the estimated CMUF exceeds the
detection threshold; in this case, determining the cause of the alarm requires additional analysis
(U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1995). For a worst-case loss context, we use
a fixed detection threshold λ that is equivalent to a significant quantity for low-enriched uranium
and allow the optimized detection threshold λ , in contrast to λ , to vary from zero to a significant
quantity. We present four modeling paradigms, M1-M4, that SOCA can incorporate to evaluate
Type I and Type II error probabilities.
In nuclear safeguards, a Type I error requires time and resources to investigate its cause. It is
possible to decrease the probability of a Type I error (α) by increasing the detection threshold,
which undesirably results in a lower probability of identifying an actual diversion (de Montmollin
& Weinstock, 1979). Thus, it might be advantageous to limit α to a sufficiently low value (e.g.,
≤ 0.05) and then maximize the detection probability (1−β ), which reduces the number of Type
I errors that must be investigated (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002); equivalently, we
can minimize the probability of Type II errors (β ). Others recommend that α be constrained to
1% or less because, even though lowering the probability of Type I errors decreases the detection
probability, the external consequences of a Type I error are higher than of a reduced detection
probability (de Montmollin & Weinstock, 1979). We introduce M1 and M2 to identify with high
probability the best measurement system configuration by minimizing β and constraining α to a
fixed significance level α .
Minimizing the probability of Type II errors while controlling for the probability of Type I errors
is known as the Neyman-Pearson paradigm (Neyman & Pearson, 1933). M1 and M2 deviate from
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the Neyman-Pearson paradigm because we minimize Type II errors over a time horizon instead of
over a single point in time. We use the following notation in M1 and M2.
Sets
X measurement system configurations
Parameters
λ fixed detection threshold (kg)
α fixed significance level, e.g., 0.05
γ relative importance of Type I and Type II errors; 0≤ γ ≤ 1
Variables
x measurement system configuration
λ optimized detection threshold (kg)
α(x,λ ) probability of a Type I error at detection threshold λ for measurement system config-
uration x





β (x,λ ) (3.5)
s.t. α(x,λ )≤ α (3.6)
It is important to choose the fixed detection threshold λ carefully because a universally applied
detection threshold cannot adequately meet the needs of individual MBAs. Some researchers note
that while the significant quantity values provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency
might be “satisfactory,” they can be easily exceeded by accumulating only random errors in large-
throughput bulk processing plants, such as reprocessing facilities. They suggest that the detection
threshold should be set based on unique measurement system properties (e.g., material quantities),
rather than on external consequences (de Montmollin & Weinstock, 1979). Beedgen (1988) uses
Monte Carlo methods to estimate a fixed detection threshold based on a significance level α . We
use an optimized detection threshold in M2, which provides the threshold that gives the lowest





β (x,λ ) (3.7)
s.t. α(x,λ )≤ α (3.8)
A competing paradigm minimizes a weighted sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities
(DeGroot & Schervish, 2012, p. 552). On one hand, detecting a diversion can be less detrimental
than acting on a Type I error; on the other, identifying a diversion is an important consideration
(de Montmollin & Weinstock, 1979). Pericchi & Pereira (2013) note that the downside to the
Neyman-Pearson paradigm is that the Type I error probability is always as close to the significance
level as possible. They conclude that minimizing a weighted sum of errors is “superior” to the
Neyman-Pearson paradigm because both types of errors converge to zero as the evidence for a
hypothesis grows, resulting in a consistent method. We introduce M3 and M4 to minimize the
weighted sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities.
Some models benefit from having a different relative importance for Type I and Type II error
probabilities. Because of the severity of each outcome, Alesina & Ferrara (2011) minimize a
weighted average of α and β to test for bias in judicial errors based on race. Their model places
different importance on the probability of condemning an innocent (α) and of letting a guilty
person free (β ). In MC&A, α and β are also both detrimental outcomes; therefore, M3 considers




γα(x,λ )+(1− γ)β (x,λ ) (3.9)






γα(x,λ )+(1− γ)β (x,λ ) (3.10)
3.5 Simulation Optimization Configuration Algorithm
We develop the Simulation Optimization Configuration Algorithm (SOCA), coded in C++, to
find the optimal measurement system configuration with confidence level 1− ε based on the con-
structs in M1-M4. For brevity, we only present pseudocode for incorporating M4; however, SOCA
can implement M1-M3 constructs with a few changes. M1 and M2 require a different objective
than M4; they also require constraints to ensure that the Type I error probability does not exceed
the fixed significance level α . M3 is a simpler version of M4 because it uses a fixed detection
threshold λ , rather than an optimized detection threshold λ .
In addition to including the constructs of M1-M4, SOCA simulates measurement device place-
ment limitations, material balance equations, and Type I and Type II error probabilities. Each
feasible measurement system configuration consists of possible device placements at valid key
measurement points. Material balance equations estimate CMUF using simulated receipt, ship-
ment, and inventory material measurements. A CUMUF test compares the estimated CMUF to
fixed and optimized detection thresholds for various measurement error samples in hypothetical
non-diversion and diversion contexts, which yields Type I and Type II error probabilities. SOCA
replicates this process and uses components from the BEST algorithm (Sanchez & Wood, 2006) to
identify the measurement system configuration that minimizes a weighted sum of Type I and Type
II error probabilities with confidence level 1− ε .
The stochastic nature of SOCA means we can only guarantee that our solution is optimal within
a pre-specified confidence level. We capture stochastic behavior in an optimization framework by
employing scenario generation, specifically, Monte Carlo sampling using independent and identi-
cally distributed random measurement error samples. SOCA implements common random num-
bers by using the same samples (representing different instances of random measurement errors) to
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evaluate each measurement system configuration; this approach reduces variance in a simulation
model (Sanchez & Wood, 2006).
To determine an optimized detection threshold, SOCA evaluates a weighted sum of Type I and
Type II error probabilities using a series of detection thresholds ranging from zero to a significant
quantity, incrementing the thresholds by a pre-defined amount. Section 4.6 compares two different
increments to show potential variations in computation time and objective values.
3.5.1 SOCA Description
We present pseudocode which details the process by which SOCA obtains the measurement
system configuration that minimizes the weighted sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities
using an optimized detection threshold. First, we obtain a single replication of measurement error
samples. Sanchez & Wood (2006) suggest that the number of replications be at least 1,000 for
other applications. They also note that the number of samples included in each replication cannot
be determined a priori; however, they point to Efron & Tibshirani (1994) who use a bootstrapping
technique with a sample size as small as nine. We use 1,000 independent replications that each con-
tain 1,000 measurement error samples in a diversion context and 1,000 measurement error samples
in a non-diversion context. Then, we evaluate the results from each replication with components
from the BEST algorithm (Sanchez & Wood, 2006) to provide an optimal measurement system
configuration with a pre-specified confidence level 1− ε . We parallelize replications to reduce the
computation time.
We add the following notation to describe SOCA:
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Sets
k ∈K key measurement points
K R ⊂K receipt key measurement points
K S ⊂K shipment key measurement points
K I ⊂K inventory key measurement points
t ∈T time periods, e.g., days over the course of one year
ω ∈Ω instances of measurement error samples
ΩN ⊂Ω instances of measurement error samples in a non-diversion context
ΩD ⊂Ω instances of measurement error samples in a diversion context
d ∈D measurement devices
d ∈ D̂k measurement devices that can be utilized at key measurement point k
X ∗ ⊂X optimal measurement system configurations
Parameters
Rkt true receipts at key measurement point k and time t (kg)
Skt true shipments at key measurement point k and time t (kg)
Ikt true inventory at key measurement point k and time t (kg)
ẽkωt random error for sample ω at key measurement point k in time t (kg)
êd measurement error scaling factor for measurement device d
λ̄ maximum optimized detection threshold, e.g., one significant quantity for uranium-235
(kg)
λ̂ optimized detection threshold increment, e.g., one kilogram (kg)
1−α1 confidence level for the measurement system configuration from Test1 in the BEST al-
gorithm
1−α2 confidence level for the measurement system configuration from Test2 in the BEST al-
gorithm
1− ε overall confidence level for the optimal measurement system configuration
Continuous Variables
R̃kdωt measured receipts for sample ω at key measurement point k utilizing device d in time t
(kg)
S̃kdωt measured shipments for sample ω at key measurement point k utilizing device d in time
t (kg)
Ĩkdωt measured inventory for sample ω at key measurement point k utilizing device d in time
t (kg)
M̃ωt estimated MUF for sample ω in time t (kg)
C̃ωt estimated CMUF for sample ω in time t (kg)
Integer Variables
NI(x,λ ) number of simulated Type I errors that occur for measurement system configuration
x and detection threshold λ
NII(x,λ ) number of simulated Type II errors that occur for measurement system configuration
x and detection threshold λ
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Binary Variables
δω(x,λ ) 1 if the estimated CMUF exceeds the detection threshold λ in sample ω for mea-
surement system configuration x; 0 otherwise
We extend Equations (3.1) and (3.2) to include measurement error samples and multiple key
measurement points for receipts, shipments, and inventories in Equations (3.11) and (3.12), re-
spectively. Equation (3.13) shows that the random variable for measured receipts is composed of
the true material quantity and a percent-based, scaled random measurement error. Similar equa-
tions apply to shipments S̃kdωt and inventory Ĩkdωt . We assume the true material quantities Rkt , Skt ,
and Ikt are obtained from an independent fuel cycle simulation, such as the Verifiable Fuel Cycle



















M̃ωτ ∀ ω ∈Ω, t ∈T (3.12)
R̃kdωt = Rkt(1+ êd ẽkωt) ∀ k ∈K R,d ∈ D̂k,ω ∈Ω, t ∈T (3.13)
In the pseudo-code for SOCA, the CUMUF test compares the estimated CMUF to optimized
detection thresholds to determine if there are Type I or Type II errors for each measurement error
sample in non-diversion and diversion contexts. A simplified version of the Test procedure from
the BEST algorithm (further described in Section 3.5.2) identifies the optimal measurement system
configuration and optimized detection threshold with confidence level 1− ε by comparing the Type
I and Type II error probabilities that result from replicating the CUMUF test.
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SOCA Pseudo-code
Description: Replicate CUMUF tests using measurement error samples in diversion and non-diversion contexts
Input: Values for relevant sets and parameters presented in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.1
Output: The measurement system configuration and optimized detection threshold that yield the lowest
weighted sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities with confidence level 1− ε
1: // Perform an independent replication of measurement error samples
2: procedure CUMUF TEST(All inputs)
3: for each measurement system configuration x ∈X := {(k,d) where k ∈K and d ∈ D̂k} do
4: for each instance of measurement error samples ω ∈ΩN ⊂Ω or ΩD ⊂Ω do
5: δω(x,λ )← 0
6: for each time period t ∈T do
7: Draw an independent random error ẽkωt ∼ Uniform(-1,1) for every k; scale the errors with êd
8: Calculate the measured receipts R̃kdωt with Equation (3.13); obtain S̃kdωt and Ĩkdωt similarly
9: Estimate the MUF M̃ωt and CMUF C̃ωt using Equations (3.11) and (3.12), respectively
10: // Set a flag if the estimated CMUF exceeds a detection threshold
11: λ ← 0
12: while λ ≤ λ̄ do
13: if C̃ωt > λ then
14: δω(x,λ )← 1
15: λ ← λ + λ̂
16: // Calculate the number of Type I and Type II errors






18: // Perform the Test procedure from BEST; this is a simplified representation
19: procedure SIMPLIFIED TEST(Number of replications R)
20: 1− ε ← 1− (α1 +α2)
21: // Test1 from the BEST algorithm
22: for each replication 1, . . . ,R do
23: Obtain NI(x,λ ) and NII(x,λ ) from CUMUF TEST
24: // Calculate the Type I and Type II error probabilities
25: α(x,λ )← NI(x,λ )/|ΩN |; β (x,λ )← NII(x,λ )/|ΩD|
26: Identify all (x,λ ) that minimize γα(x,λ )+(1− γ)β (x,λ )
27: for x ∈X do
28: if x is optimal in 100 · (1−α1)% of replications then
29: X ∗←X ∗∪{x}
30: if |X ∗|= 1 then
31: x ∈X ∗ is optimal with confidence 1−α1
32: else
33: Implement Test2 from the BEST algorithm to ensure x is optimal with confidence (1−α1)(1−α2)
34: Measurement system configuration x is optimal with confidence 1− ε
3.5.2 BEST Algorithm
In general, the BEST algorithm identifies a probabilistic upper Bound on the optimal objective
function value and a deterministic lower-bounding function, Enumerates a set of first-stage solu-
tions, Simulates second-stage outcomes, and Tests the simulated outcomes to identify the first-
stage solution with a pre-specified level of confidence. We use the Test procedure from the BEST
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algorithm in Sanchez & Wood (2006) to evaluate solutions from SOCA. We obtain measurement
system configurations (corresponding to first-stage solutions) and the number of Type I and Type II
errors (corresponding to second-stage outcomes) from the CUMUF test in SOCA, which enables
us to bypass the Bound, Enumerate, and Simulate steps.
In the Test procedure, we evaluate each measurement system configuration via subset selec-
tion to eliminate configurations from X that are unlikely to be optimal. We assess independent
replications of CUMUF tests using a bootstrap screening method, i.e., Test1 in Sanchez & Wood
(2006), which ranks each configuration based on the number of replications in which the config-
uration gives the lowest weighted sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities. The subset of
configurations, X ∗ ⊂X , that yields the best solution in 100 · (1−α1)% of replications contains
the optimal solution with a pre-specified confidence level of 1−α1.
If |X ∗| = 1, then x ∈X ∗ is optimal with confidence 1−α1. However, if there is more than
one element in X ∗, we can use an additional method, i.e., Test2 in Sanchez & Wood (2006),
to determine how many additional measurement error samples are needed in the CUMUF test to
ensure that the best solution from Test1 is ε-optimal with approximate confidence (1−α1)(1−α2).
We do not show Test2 in the pseudocode because it is unlikely X ∗ contains more than one element
for the system we analyze in this paper. We choose α1 and α2 so that the fixed, overall confidence
level 1− ε is equivalent to 1− (α1 +α2).
3.6 Minimum Variance Configuration Model
The Minimum Variance Configuration Model (MVCM) finds a measurement system configura-
tion that minimizes the population variance of the estimated MUF in a system over a fixed, discrete
time horizon. Reducing measurement uncertainty enables us to more accurately estimate true ma-
terial quantities. The purpose of MVCM is to find a configuration that produces a comparable
weighted sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities to the configuration from SOCA. Section
4.6 shows that MVCM obtains the same optimal configuration as SOCA, but more quickly.
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MVCM is a deterministic integer program, which simplifies the stochastic complexities present
in SOCA, such as samples of random measurement errors. MVCM decreases the number of
variables and constraints required in SOCA to find the same measurement system configuration by
utilizing the relationship between the population variance of the estimated MUF and the weighted
sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities. In addition, MVCM exploits a branch-and-bound
algorithm to avoid completely enumerating solutions (Land & Doig, 1960). These attributes enable
MVCM to solve faster than SOCA.
Appendix A shows how the population variance of the estimated MUF relates to Type I and
Type II error probabilities. We conclude that lowering the random measurement error within C̃t
provides a lower Type I error probability at a given key measurement point before any time t, but
may not lower the Type II error probability. However, in Section 4.6, we show empirically that a
weighted sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities is lowered for our single enrichment facility
example considering one material in a worst-case loss context.
MVCM requires the following notation modifications:
Additional Sets
k ∈ ˆKd key measurement points at which device d can be utilized
Additional and Modified Parameters
ẽdt random variable corresponding to êd ẽkωt (kg)
σ2dt variance of error measurements for device d in time period t (kg
2)
Modified Variables
R̃kdt random variable corresponding to R̃kdωt (kg)
S̃kdt random variable corresponding to S̃kdωt (kg)
Ĩkdt random variable corresponding to Ĩkdωt (kg)
Binary Variables



























Variables in the model are subject to the following constraints:
∑
k∈ ˆKd
xkd = 1 ∀ d ∈D (3.15)
∑
d∈D̂k
xkd = 1 ∀ k ∈K (3.16)
xkd binary ∀ k ∈K ,d ∈D (3.17)
Objective (3.14) minimizes the population variance of the estimated MUF in the measurement
system over the time horizon. Equation (3.18) restates Equation (3.11), except that it uses random






































Equation (3.20) shows that the random variable for measured receipts is composed of the true ma-
terial quantity Rkt and a percent-based random measurement error ẽdt . Equation (3.21) computes
the variance of the random measurement error as σ2dt . The variance for the receipt measurement
then simplifies to Equation (3.22), which is based only on the true material quantity and the vari-
ance of the random measurement error. The same method follows for shipment and inventory
measurements. We assume a constant, non-measured beginning inventory for every time period,
which reduces the inventory measurement variance to the single term seen in Objective (3.14),

















































Constraints (3.15) ensure that each device is used at only one key measurement point and Con-
straints (3.16) ensure that there is only one device used at each key measurement point. We assume
that each device is utilized in every time period.
3.7 Results
In this section, we show that NUMSO provides comparable results much more quickly than a
Monte Carlo simulation of SGA. We note that the purpose of SGA is not to optimize measurement
system configurations, but is to be a flexible toolkit that can simulate nuclear material in different
hypothetical nuclear fuel cycles and diversion contexts. Therefore, we present computation times
to show the benefit of using SOCA and MVCM to specifically optimize measurement system con-
figurations, rather than to provide a direct comparison to SGA. For the remainder of this section,
we refer to a Monte Carlo simulation of SGA simply as SGA because all results use this approach.
We use Problems 1-3, introduced in Section 3.2, to demonstrate that SOCA obtains similar
Type I and Type II error probabilities compared to Shugart & King (2016), but obtains them at
least an order of magnitude faster. We also show MVCM provides the same optimal measurement
system configuration in Problem 1 even more quickly than SOCA. We compare results using fixed
and optimized detection thresholds in the CUMUF test. SOCA obtains an optimal configuration
with a pre-specified confidence level using components of the BEST algorithm.
We show results for a fixed detection threshold of 75 kilograms and a time horizon of 360 days,
which correspond to one significant quantity of low-enriched uranium and a timeliness detection
goal of one year, respectively. For these problems, we use an equal relative importance (γ = 0.5)
in Objective (3.10). We use the same uniform random error bounds as Shugart & King (2016);
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inventory devices have lower error bounds because they must be more precise to account for much
higher material quantities at the Cascade key measurement point. We assume that material quanti-
ties are constant over time; therefore, we can scale the population variance of the estimated MUF in
Objective (3.14) by the number of time periods to obtain the time-independent population variance.
3.7.1 Computation Times
In SOCA, we model and evaluate CUMUF test replications using the C++11 programming
language via the GNU Compiler Collection Version 4.8.4 (Free Software Foundation, 2014). We
parallelize replications with GNU Parallel (Tange, 2011). We implement the BEST algorithm
in SOCA with Python Version 2.7.6 (Python Software Foundation, 2013). We model and solve
MVCM with AMPL Version 20130109 (AMPL Optimization LLC, 2013; Fourer et al., 2003) and
CPLEX Version 12.6.0.1 with default settings (IBM, 2014; IBM ILOG AMPL, 2010), respectively.
We perform all computations on a Sun Fire x4250 workstation under the Ubuntu 14.04 operating
system with two Quad-core CPUs running at 2.83 GHz with 16 GB RAM.
Shugart & King (2016) implement a Monte Carlo simulation of 100 replications of 1,000 SGA
process samples with Matlab R2014b (The MathWorks, Inc., 2014). They perform computations
on an IMac Pro under the Windows 7 Pro operating system with twelve Dual-core CPUs running
at 2.79 GHz with 96GB RAM; however, Shugart & King (2016) use a single core to obtain results.
Table 3.4 shows the total computation time needed for each problem, referenced by the table
or figure containing the results, using SGA, SOCA with fixed and optimized detection thresholds,
and MVCM. For all problems, SOCA decreases the computation time compared to SGA by over
an order of magnitude. For Problem 1, MVCM decreases computation time compared to SGA by
nearly 100%.
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Table 3.4: Computation times for SGA, SOCA with a fixed detection threshold, SOCA∗ with an
optimized detection threshold, and MVCM














SGA 73,400 - 61,200 - 171,000 -
SOCA 189 99.7 176 99.7 4,180 97.6
SOCA∗ 284 99.6 275 99.6 5,890 96.6
MVCM 0.167 100 - - - -
NUMSO implements parallel processing; however, we only use eight cores to evaluate repli-
cations, which provides small improvements compared to our other enhancements. For example,
the computation time needed for SOCA in Problem 1 on a single core is approximately 1,500
seconds, compared to 189 seconds on eight cores; this is a marginal reduction compared to the
order-of-magnitude improvement the other enhancements provide over SGA. Using an optimized
detection threshold in SOCA requires slightly more computation time than employing a fixed
threshold, which may be inconsequential compared to the benefits discussed in Section 3.7.2.
3.7.2 Problem 1 Results
Problem 1 represents the case in which we seek to determine the configuration of n devices at n
locations (n=3) that gives the lowest weighted sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities, or the
lowest population variance of the estimated MUF, provided location-dependent device precisions.
The three possible random measurement error distributions for flow measurements are Uniform
(-2%, 2%), Uniform(-5%, 5%), and Uniform(-10%, 10%). The measurement error distribution for
the single inventory measurement device, which is always utilized at the enrichment cascade key
measurement point, is Uniform(-0.02%, 0.02%).
In this problem, SOCA estimates the probability of Type I errors to be zero, which indicates
that the accumulation of random errors in a non-diversion context never exceeds the detection
threshold. Table 3.5 shows that the results from SOCA match those from SGA for all measurement
system configurations. The results from MVCM indicate that minimizing the population variance
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of the estimated MUF yields the same optimal configuration as minimizing a weighted sum of
Type I and Type II error probabilities.












± 2, 5, 10% 0.8569±0.0113 0.8550±0.0112 21.43
± 2, 10, 5% 0.7771±0.0131 0.7734±0.0136 21.52
± 5, 2, 10% 0.8481±0.0099 0.8147±0.0124 21.47
± 5, 10, 2% 0.7457±0.0025 0.7437±0.0142 21.59
± 10, 2, 5% 0.7143±0.0143 0.7125±0.0144 21.69
± 10, 5, 2% 0.7061±0.0149 0.7066±0.0147 21.72
Table 3.6 provides Type I and Type II error probabilities using an optimized detection threshold.
For the best measurement system configuration, we are able to identify the lost material in every
hypothetical diversion context sample, while incurring no Type I errors. These results demonstrate
the benefit of using an optimized, rather than a fixed, detection threshold. The threshold for the
best configuration is almost three times lower than the International Atomic Energy Agency’s limit
for uranium-235 of 75 kilograms.












± 2, 5, 10% 0.0000±0.0000 1.0000±0.0000 0.0000±0.0000 26.41±1.973
± 2, 10, 5% 0.0000±0.0000 1.0000±0.0000 0.0000±0.0000 34.59±2.701
± 5, 2, 10% 0.0000±0.0000 1.0000±0.0000 0.0000±0.0000 30.04±2.372
± 5, 10, 2% 0.0000±0.0001 1.0000±0.0001 0.0000±0.0001 38.83±2.909
± 10, 2, 5% 0.0004±0.0006 0.9998±0.0005 0.0006±0.0008 43.16±2.607
± 10, 5, 2% 0.0006±0.0008 0.9996±0.0006 0.0010±0.0010 43.73±2.456
We find the optimized detection threshold by identifying which value between 0 and 75 kilo-
grams (using one-kilogram increments) yields the lowest weighted sum of Type I and Type II error
probabilities. In certain cases, a finer increment (e.g., 0.1 kilogram) might be required to attain the
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optimal solution; however, Table 3.7 shows that we obtain the same solution using an increment of
one kilogram as with 0.1 kilogram, while requiring less computation time (284 seconds compared
to 3,984 seconds).
Table 3.7: SOCA configuration results for different optimized detection threshold increments















± 2, 5, 10% 0.0000±0.0000 26.41±1.973 0.0000±0.0000 25.85±1.888
± 2, 10, 5% 0.0000±0.0000 34.59±2.701 0.0000±0.0000 34.22±2.862
± 5, 2, 10% 0.0000±0.0000 30.04±2.372 0.0000±0.0000 29.54±2.215
± 5, 10, 2% 0.0000±0.0001 38.83±2.909 0.0000±0.0001 38.45±3.253
± 10, 2, 5% 0.0006±0.0008 43.16±2.607 0.0005±0.0007 42.73±2.549
± 10, 5, 2% 0.0010±0.0010 43.73±2.456 0.0009±0.0009 43.37±2.502
3.7.3 Problem 2 Results
Problem 2 finds the key measurement point at which improving device precision reduces ob-
jective values the most. For this problem, all random error distributions are initially Uniform(-5%,
5%) for flow measurements and Uniform(-0.01%, 0.01%) for inventory measurements in the base
case. Then, we obtain the weighted sums of Type I and Type II error probabilities that result from
individually improving each flow measurement distribution to Uniform(-3%, 3%) or the inventory
measurement distribution to Uniform(-0.008%, 0.008%).
Table 3.8 shows that SOCA obtains results similar to those obtained by SGA using a fixed
detection threshold. In this problem, SOCA also identifies the lost material in every hypothetical
diversion sample with an optimized detection threshold and estimates the probability of Type I
errors to be zero. We find the best key measurement point at which to decrease a method’s random
error bounds is the Input. The lowest average optimized detection threshold corresponds to the
highest detection probability using a fixed detection threshold, indicating that it might be better to
allocate resources to find the lowest detection threshold for a measurement system than simply to
make small improvements to measurement devices to increase the detection probability.
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Base 0.6955±0.0093 0.6936±0.0147 1.0000±0.0000 27.85±2.309
Input 0.7407±0.0084 0.7393±0.0138 1.0000±0.0000 22.65±1.823
Inventory 0.6095±0.0105 0.6082±0.0164 1.0000±0.0000 26.12±2.333
Output 0.7131±0.0094 0.7115±0.0141 1.0000±0.0000 25.56±2.016
Tails 0.6939±0.0102 0.6969±0.0147 1.0000±0.0000 27.49±2.230
3.7.4 Problem 3 Results
Figure 3.2: Type I error and detection probabilities based on measurement frequency for a fixed
detection threshold and two different measurement error levels, denoted by (flow %, inventory %)
Problem 3 determines the effect of measurement frequency on measurement system configura-
tions and objective values. We equally segment the time horizon by the number of measurements
to determine when devices are utilized as a proxy for time periods. Figures 3.2-3.4 show Type I
error and detection probabilities for two levels of uniform random measurement error bounds.
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Figure 3.2 depicts similar results to those from Shugart & King (2016) using a fixed detection
threshold. The Type I error and detection probabilities decrease and increase, respectively, as the
number of measurements increases for the worst-case loss context.
Figure 3.3: Type I error and detection probabilities based on measurement frequency for an
optimized detection threshold and two different measurement error levels, denoted by (flow %,
inventory %)
Figure 3.3 indicates that by using an optimized detection threshold, the Type I error and de-
tection probabilities reach 1.0 and 0.0, respectively, by measuring far less frequently than using
a fixed detection threshold. Measurements must be taken twenty-four times per day to achieve a
near perfect detection probability using a fixed detection threshold, but only once every four days
using an optimized detection threshold.
Figure 3.4 demonstrates that the optimized detection threshold decreases as the measurement
frequency increases. This figure also shows that a larger detection threshold is required for systems
that have less precise measurement devices. For this problem, SOCA obtains better detection
probabilities using a lower detection threshold and measuring less frequently than the International
Atomic Energy Agency significant quantity and timeliness detection goal limits.
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Figure 3.4: Optimal detection threshold based on measurement frequency for two different
measurement error levels, denoted by (flow %, inventory %)
3.8 Conclusion
NUMSO uses operations research techniques, specifically, simulation optimization and integer
programming, to find the optimal measurement system configuration with a pre-specified level
of confidence. We develop SOCA and MVCM to find optimal configurations using two different
objectives: minimize (i) a weighted sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities and (ii) population
variance of the estimated MUF. We show that these models produce the same optimal configuration
for our specific enrichment facility measurement system considering one material in a worst-case
loss context. In addition, we are able to find the best key measurement point at which to improve
the precision of a measurement device and examine the effect of measurement frequency on the
Type I error and detection probabilities using SOCA.
We show that our models obtain similar results to those from Shugart & King (2016), but
are able to generate them considerably faster. For each problem, SOCA reduces computation
time by at least an order of magnitude. We obtain the same configuration with MVCM almost
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instantaneously. This is a considerable improvement over using a Monte Carlo simulation of SGA
to optimize configurations.
We also find the optimized detection threshold that gives the lowest objective value in a worst-
case loss context using SOCA. We show that an optimized detection threshold lowers the weighted
sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities while measuring less frequently compared to a fixed
threshold, which indicates that measurement systems should have unique detection thresholds to
save the time and resources spent measuring more often than necessary.
Finding the optimal measurement system configuration for a realistic fuel cycle is prohibitive
using existing tools, such as SGA, because of the large computation time required to analyze a
single facility. We show that NUMSO quickly finds an optimal configuration with high confidence
for this simple case, which indicates that it might also obtain the best configuration for a realistic
fuel cycle within a reasonable amount of time. However, we need to test NUMSO on a larger
measurement system to show that it can be extended for practical applications.
We can add new models to NUMSO to extend its capability to find solutions to other impor-
tant problems in nuclear safeguards. One potential problem is, provided a measurement system
configuration and a fixed budget, determine how to improve measurement devices to reduce the
population variance of the estimated MUF in the system the most. Another possible problem is
to find the most cost-effective way to reduce population variance of the estimated MUF by a pre-
determined amount.
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CHAPTER 4
OPTIMIZING NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY
MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS
The predecessor of a paper to be submitted to Progress in Nuclear Energy9
Nicolas Shugart10, Benjamin Johnson11, Jeffrey King12, Alexandra Newman13
4.1 Abstract
The dangerous ability to create nuclear weapons from uranium-235 and plutonium-239 makes
it imperative to closely account for these materials as they progress through a nuclear fuel cycle.
Improving measurement systems gives more accurate estimates of material quantities and mate-
rial unaccounted for (MUF). This paper provides solutions to three potential problems in current
measurement systems: how to best (i) locate measurement methods given fixed purchase and uti-
lization budgets, (ii) increase the precision of existing methods given a fixed improvement budget,
and (iii) reduce measurement uncertainty in the system while limiting the cost of the improvement.
The NUclear Measurement System Optimization (NUMSO) toolkit uses operations research tech-
niques to find optimal solutions to these problems based on minimizing the scaled, estimated MUF
variance. The SafeGuards Analysis (SGA) toolkit employs a Monte Carlo simulation to analyze if
NUMSO provides good solutions in terms of the Type I error probabilities, i.e., material loss false
alarm probabilities, in a measurement system. Solving these problems using a realistic fuel cycle
scenario demonstrates the capability of NUMSO and SGA to address representative problems in
nuclear safeguards. This paper shows that NUMSO quickly yields similar or better Type I error
9This paper is a result of an interdisciplinary project that features operations research and nuclear engineering com-
ponents. Nicolas Shugart’s dissertation in the Nuclear Science and Engineering Program also includes a modified
version of this paper. I am the primary author for Sections 4.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, half of 4.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.6, and 4.8.
10Primary researcher and author, PhD Candidate, Nuclear Science and Engineering Program, Colorado School of
Mines
11Primary researcher and author, PhD Candidate, Operations Research with Engineering Program, Colorado School
of Mines
12Associate Professor, Nuclear Science and Engineering Program, Colorado School of Mines
13Professor, Operations Research with Engineering Program, Colorado School of Mines
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probabilities compared to several intuitive analyses that take much longer. However, the authors
recommend that a thorough comparison be performed using SGA to ensure that, for a specific
application, NUMSO yields acceptable Type I error probabilities.
4.2 Nomenclature
Acronyms
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
MC&A material control and accountability
MUF material unaccounted for
MBA mass balance area
HEU high-enriched uranium





NUMSO NUclear Measurement System Optimization
MVCM Minimum Variance Configuration Model
MIVM Minimum Improved Variance Model
MICM Minimum Improvement Cost Model
SGA SafeGuards Analysis
Sets
t ∈T time periods
k ∈K key measurement points
K R ⊂K receipt key measurement points
K S ⊂K shipment key measurement points
K I ⊂K inventory key measurement points
f ∈F material forms
k ∈ K̂ f key measurement points for material form f
d ∈D measurement methods
d ∈ D̂ f measurement methods for material form f
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Parameters
R̃kt estimated receipts at key measurement point k and time period t (kg)
S̃kt estimated shipments at key measurement point k and time period t (kg)
Ĩkt estimated inventory at key measurement point k and time period t (kg)
M̃t estimated MUF in time period t (kg)
C̃t estimated CMUF in time period t (kg)
qk true material quantity at key measurement point k (kg)
ēd uncertainty bound for measurement method d (%)
êkd uncertainty bound conversion factor for measurement method d at key measurement
point k (%)
σ̂2k estimated MUF variance scaling factor for key measurement point k (unitless)
cPd purchase cost for measurement method d ($)
cUd utilization cost for measurement method d ($)
bP purchase budget ($)
bU utilization budget ($)
cId improvement cost for measurement method d (
$/kg)
bI improvement budget ($)
x∗kd fixed measurement system configuration for measurement method d at key measure-
ment point k (unitless)
i pre-specified fraction of scaled, estimated MUF variance reduction (unitless)
e+k uncertainty bound increment for key measurement point k (kg)
ĉIk improvement cost scaling factor for key measurement point k (unitless)
Binary Variables
Xkd 1 if measurement method d is utilized at key measurement point k; 0 otherwise (unit-
less)
Continuous Variables
Ikd uncertainty bound improvement for measurement method d at key measurement
point k (unitless)
Integer Variables
Îkd uncertainty bound improvement scale for measurement method d at key measure-
ment point k (kg)
4.3 Introduction
Current nuclear fuel cycles follow uranium and plutonium from the time uranium is mined as
ore, the uranium and plutonium are used to produce energy, and the resulting materials are treated,
stored, and permanently disposed. Initially, the uranium is not a concern to public safety because
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it is only slightly radioactive, but uranium-235 (the isotope used for electricity production) is en-
riched to a higher concentration to produce nuclear fuel. A nuclear reactor fissions uranium-235 to
produce power, which yields plutonium-239 (which can also be fissioned to produce power) and
other isotopes. Uranium-235 and plutonium-239 are able to be used to produce nuclear weapons,
which makes it imperative to closely account for these materials as they progress through a nuclear
fuel cycle.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a group of activities, called nu-
clear safeguards, to ensure its 140 member states are not using their civilian nuclear fuel cycles to
produce nuclear weapons (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2016). Nuclear safeguards seek
to ensure that nuclear materials are not lost from within a nuclear fuel cycle. Material control and
accountability (MC&A) is a type of safeguard that attempts to prevent the development of these
weapons by detecting and deterring the theft or, “diversion,” of nuclear material (U.S. Department
of Energy, 2011).
It is important to analyze and enhance MC&A methods because nuclear terrorism is an im-
mediate and extreme threat to global security. Terrorists have the desire and ability to turn raw
nuclear materials into a weapon; therefore, making it more difficult to acquire these materials im-
proves global security (The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2016). According to the
Nuclear Threat Initiative (2007), there are an increasing number of entities seeking nuclear and/or
other radioactive material, i.e., material that emits ionizing radiation but is not capable of a nuclear
explosion (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007).
This paper addresses three representative problems in current MC&A measurement systems:
how to (i) best locate measurement methods in a nuclear fuel cycle given fixed purchase and uti-
lization budgets (Problem 1), (ii) increase the precision of existing methods given a fixed improve-
ment budget (Problem 2), and (iii) reduce measurement uncertainty in the system while limiting
the cost of the improvement (Problem 3).
The NUclear Measurement System Optimization toolkit (NUMSO), extended from Johnson
et al. (2016a), uses operations research techniques, specifically, integer programming, to find op-
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timal solutions to these problems based on minimizing the scaled, estimated material unaccounted
for (MUF) variance in the system. NUMSO uses the Minimum Variance Configuration Model
(MVCM), the Minimum Improved Variance Model (MIVM), and the Minimum Improvement Cost
Model (MICM) to obtain solutions to Problems 1-3, respectively. The SafeGuards Analysis toolkit
(SGA) from Shugart & King (2016) and Shugart et al. (2016) analyzes if NUMSO’s solutions yield
lower Type I error probabilities in a measurement system.
Providing optimal solutions to these problems and verifying NUMSO’s effectiveness using a
realistic fuel cycle scenario demonstrates the capability of NUMSO and SGA to address potential
problems in nuclear safeguards. These toolkits use hypothetical measurement methods because the
focus of this paper is to demonstrate their ability to give answers to representative problems. Figure















Analyze MVCM’s results with the
“manual average start” and “manual
cheap start” analyses
Analyze MIVM and MICM’s re-
sults with the “most sensitive” and
“cheapest” analyses
SGA Analysis
Figure 4.1: Relationship between the problems, the NUMSO models, and the SGA analyses.
SGA analyses (detailed in Section 4.5) provide intuitive solutions to each problem and indicate if
NUMSO yields lower Type I error probabilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.4 details general MC&A mea-
surement systems, introduces operations research methodology, and describes NUMSO and SGA
in depth. Section 4.5 explores the specific fuel cycle scenario NUMSO and SGA enhance in this
demonstration, details Problems 1-3, and conveys the rationale of the SGA analyses. Sections 4.6
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and 4.7 provide results and discussion for each problem using NUMSO and SGA, respectively.
Section 4.8 concludes the paper with a summary of results and recommendations for future work.
4.4 Background
The focus of material control within MC&A is to protect nuclear materials and prevent their un-
approved removal from authorized locations or to detect their absence in a timely manner. The pur-
pose of material accountability within MC&A is to ensure there is an accurate account of nuclear
material within a nuclear fuel cycle (U.S. Department of Energy, 2011). More specifically, MC&A
focuses on the material and inventory balance at one or more material balance areas (MBAs) to
assess if any nuclear material is missing (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002).
The theft or loss of nuclear and other radioactive material is an international security concern
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 2015). From 1993-2014, there were 714 instances of theft
or loss of nuclear and other radioactive material from facilities or during transport reported to the
Incident and Trafficking Database (IAEA’s system of tracking illicit incidents involving nuclear
and other radioactive material). The majority of these occurrences involved materials from in-
dustrial or medical applications, which are mostly harmless. Several instances, however, included
high-enriched uranium or plutonium, which, if accumulated in sufficiently large quantities, can be
made into nuclear weapons. These events show that people remain able to obtain this dangerous
material and underscore the importance of continually improving MC&A methods to help iden-
tify its potential theft or loss. Table 4.1 shows the confirmed nuclear material trafficking incidents
reported to the Incident and Trafficking Database involving high-enriched uranium (HEU) and
plutonium between 1993 and 2007 (Bunn, 2013).
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Table 4.1: HEU and plutonium incidents confirmed by the Incident and Trafficking Database,
1993-2007
Date Location Material Quantity
05/24/1993 Vilnius, Lithuania HEU 150 g
03/??/1994 St. Petersburg, Russian Federation HEU 2.97 kg
05/10/1994 Tengen-Wiechs, Germany Pu 6.20 g
06/13/1994 Landshut, Germany HEU 795 mg
07/25/1994 Munich, Germany Pu 240 mg
08/10/1994 Munich Airport, Germany Pu 363 g
12/14/1994 Prague, Czech Republic HEU 2.73 kg
06/??/1995 Moscow, Russian Federation HEU 1.70 kg
06/06/1995 Prague, Czech Republic HEU 415 mg
06/08/1995 Ceske Budejovice, Czech Republic HEU 16.9 g
05/29/1999 Rousse, Bulgaria HEU 10.0 g
12/??/2000 Karlsruhe, Germany Pu 1.00 mg
07/16/2001 Paris, France HEU 500 mg
06/26/2003 Sadahlo, Georgia HEU 170 g
03/??/2005 to
04/??/2005
New Jersey, USA HEU 3.30 g
06/24/2005 Fukui, Japan HEU 1.70 mg
02/01/2006 Tbilisi, Georgia HEU 79.5 g
03/30/2006 Hennigsdorf, Germany HEU 47.5 g
4.4.1 Material Control and Accountability
An MC&A measurement system estimates material entering (i.e., receipts) and exiting (i.e.,
shipments) one or more nuclear fuel cycle facilities, in addition to deriving estimates for all batch
quantities of material present at the facilities (i.e., physical inventory). To do this, a system utilizes
measurement methods to quantify a physical attribute of the material. A measurement system con-
figuration is a specific arrangement of these methods and their corresponding parameter settings,
which requires the ability to detect a substantial amount of missing material with high probability
to establish its effectiveness (de Montmollin & Weinstock, 1979).
In an MC&A measurement system, MBAs and key measurement points identify boundaries
and locations, respectively, at which measurements are taken. An MBA is a facility or subset of a
facility provided that (1) the amount transferred into or out of the MBA can be quantified and (2)
the physical inventory within the MBA can be quantified “when necessary” (International Atomic
Energy Agency, 2002). For example, an MBA can be an entire enrichment facility or an individ-
ual centrifuge within an enrichment facility. In practice, facilities in a nuclear fuel cycle might
comprise a single MBA; however, in complex facilities such as manufacturing and reprocessing
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plants, two or more MBAs might be necessary to adequately model activities within the facility.
The locations where receipt, shipment, and inventory material can be measured are potential key
measurement points (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2008).
One primary MC&A objective is to provide measurements that are able to detect nuclear ma-
terial loss despite uncertainties in their estimates. To provide assurance that nuclear material is
not missing from an MBA, accountability measurements, which establish initial values of nuclear
material, and verification measurements, which authenticate the amount of material present, need
to be of the highest quality (U.S. Department of Energy, 2011). Estimates of MUF and cumulative
material unaccounted for (CMUF) are primary indicators of material loss (Stewart & Jaech, 1970).
The estimated MUF is the difference between the measured receipt, shipment, and physical in-
ventory quantities; the estimated CMUF is the estimated MUF accumulated over all previous time
periods.
Detecting material loss is difficult because measurement uncertainties result in a non-zero esti-
mated MUF even if no nuclear material is actually missing from the MBA. It is necessary, there-
fore, to quantify the random and systematic measurement uncertainties to assess the statistical
significance of any differences between true and estimated material in an MBA (U.S. Department
of Energy, 2011). A random uncertainty is a positive or negative fluctuation from the true quantity,
which results from precision limitations of the measurement method. A systematic uncertainty is
a constant bias that can be caused by improper use or function of a measurement method, which
results in a shift of the measurement from the true quantity. This paper focuses on random uncer-
tainties.
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) estimate the MUF M̃t and CMUF C̃t at the end of each time period
t during a finite, discrete time horizon T = {1, ...,T}, respectively. Measured receipts R̃kt , ship-
ments S̃kt , and physical inventory Ĩkt are random variables because measurements are uncertain.
The toolkits limit each key measurement point k to possible receipt, shipment, and physical inven-
tory locations K R, K S, and K I , respectively. The estimated inventory at the beginning of t = 1














M̃τ ∀ t ∈T (4.2)
Figure 4.2 shows an example of an MBA, which represents an enrichment facility with input,
output, waste, and cascade key measurement points. The cascade represents a series of centrifuges
used to enrich the uranium. In each time period, the material balance equation uses measurements
at each key measurement point to obtain an estimate for the MUF. The loss stream represents any
actual or estimated MUF from the MBA.













Figure 4.2: An example enrichment facility MBA with flow streams, an inventory location, and
potential material loss stream
Table 4.2 shows the significant quantity and timeliness detection goal limits provided by the
IAEA for the primary nuclear materials relevant to safeguards. Timeliness detection goals are the
“target detection times applicable to specific nuclear material categories.” A significant quantity is
“the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear
explosive device cannot be excluded” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002). Countries are
able to use plutonium, uranium-233, and highly-enriched uranium to create nuclear weapons. Low-
enriched uranium and thorium need extra processing before countries can use them in a nuclear
weapon, which results in higher significant quantities and longer timeliness detection goals than
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those for the other materials (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002).
Table 4.2: Significant quantities of nuclear materials and their associated timeliness goals











High-enriched uranium Metal 1 month




(uranium-235 < 20 at%)
Unirradiated fresh fuel
75 kg uranium-235, 10 metric tons natural
uranium, or 20 metric tons depleted uranium
1 year
Thorium Unirradiated fresh fuel 20 metric tons 1 year
A hypothetical material loss likely occurs if the estimated CMUF exceeds a significant quantity
over any time period within a timeliness detection goal limit. It is important to note, however, that
actual material loss does not necessarily occur in practice even if the estimated CMUF exceeds a
significant quantity; in this case, determining the cause of the alarm requires additional analysis
(U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1995). A Type I error results from “falsely
concluding that nuclear material has been lost when in fact no material has been lost” and a Type
II error results from “concluding that a diversion did not occur when in fact it did occur” (Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, 2002). Figure 4.3 summarizes Type I and Type II error outcomes.




Identify a loss when one does not exist
Correct Outcome




Do not identify a loss when one does not exist
Type II Error
Do not identify a loss when one exists
Figure 4.3: Summary of Type I and Type II error outcomes
4.4.2 Introduction to Optimization
Operations research is a field that uses various analytical techniques to make better, more in-
formed decisions. Operations research combines methods such as statistical analysis and mathe-
matical modeling, specifically, optimization, to arrive at optimal or near-optimal solutions to com-
plex problems.
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Mathematical models require input parameters, decision variables, an objective function, and
problem-specific constraints. Input parameters are fixed values that depict physical aspects of real-
ity, such as the material flow in a fuel cycle. Parameters can also include physical or desired limits
on system variable values, e.g., the random uncertainty bounds of a measurement method. Deci-
sion variables represent continuous or discrete aspects of the problem that are initially unknown
and are determined by finding the optimal or near-optimal solution to the problem, such as where
to locate a measurement method. The objective function is a combination of parameters and de-
cision variables that describes the goal of the problem, e.g., minimizing estimated MUF variance.
Constraints are needed to ensure that limitations imposed by the nature of the problem are upheld,
e.g., budget restrictions.
Integer programming is a branch of optimization that restricts at least some of the decision
variables in the problem to be integer. The primary benefit of integer programming compared to
other optimization methods is the ability to model binary decisions, represented by a value of one
if a decision is to be made and zero if a decision is not to be made, e.g., one if a measurement
method is utilized at a key measurement point; zero otherwise. Binary variables also allow for log-
ical constructs, e.g., if-then statements. Mixed-integer programs include continuous, in addition to
integer, variables. Algorithms for integer programs enumerate a subset of feasible, non-dominated
solutions to determine an optimum. The limitation of integer programs is that they are non-convex,
which makes them more difficult to solve than their convex, linear counterparts. Linear programs
search extreme point solutions, i.e., vertices in a convex set, for a local optimum, which is guar-
anteed to be the global optimum due to convexity. A drawback of linear programs is that they
only contain linear constraints and continuous variables, which limits their applicability to many
problems.
Integer and linear programming MC&A applications in the literature are sparse. However, this
paper provides examples of these techniques used elsewhere in nuclear energy. Fourcade et al.
(1997) develop an integer program to plan nuclear reactor shutdowns and demonstrate that their
methods quickly solve a four-reactor, single-site scenario. Johnson et al. (2016b) use a mixed-
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integer program to sequence the disposal of high-level nuclear waste; they greatly reduce the heat
load concentration in a repository compared to intuitive methods. Silvennoinen et al. (1980) use
a linear program to determine that the optimal strategy to minimize the economic risk and the
proliferation hazard of a light water reactor fuel cycle is to recycle plutonium in discontinuous
batches and to introduce an economic penalty based on fuel cycle costs. Lehtveer et al. (2015)
analyze multiple criteria of nuclear power in a linear program to minimize the total discounted
energy system costs over an extended time horizon; they find that nuclear power is important to
mitigate climate change based on energy security and affordability.
4.4.3 NUclear Measurement System Optimization
The NUclear Measurement System Optimization (NUMSO) toolkit uses operations research
techniques, specifically, integer programming, to quickly find solutions to the three nuclear safe-
guards problems introduced in Section 4.3 and detailed in Section 4.5. These techniques can solve
complex problems much more quickly than other methods used in nuclear energy applications
(Johnson et al., 2016a,b), such as Monte Carlo simulations (Gul et al., 2016; Haghighat & Wag-
ner, 2003; Lewis & Böhm, 1984; Nuttin et al., 2005). Another benefit is that NUMSO provides
assurance of globally optimal solutions using a branch-and-bound algorithm (Atamtürk & Savels-
bergh, 2005; Land & Doig, 1960). This paper extends the previously published capabilities of
NUMSO by modifying MVCM from Johnson et al. (2016a) and implementing two new mixed-
integer quadratic programs, MIVM and MICM.
MVCM obtains an optimal measurement system configuration by minimizing the scaled, es-
timated MUF in a measurement system. Previously, Stewart (1970) identifies how many mea-
surements should be taken at each location of a hypothetical fuel cycle facility by approximately
minimizing the estimated MUF variance subject to a cost constraint. Bouchey et al. (1971) use
a multi-stage dynamic program to solve the same problem but without using Stewart’s variance
approximation. Rather than finding how many measurements to take at a location, MVCM deter-
mines where to locate measurements. Suzuki & Ihara (2008) use linear programming to compare
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the trade-off between cost and probability of detecting a hypothetical diversion of two specific
measurement methods, destructive and non-destructive analysis. MIVM and MICM find the best
scaled, estimated MUF improvement in a system given a budget constraint and the most cost-
effective way to reduce the scaled, estimated MUF variance in a system by a pre-specified amount,
respectively.
Johnson et al. (2016a) show that lowering the random measurement uncertainty within C̃t pro-
vides a lower Type I error probability at a given key measurement point before any time t. They
obtain the same measurement system configuration by minimizing the estimated MUF variance
and weighted sum of Type I and Type II error probabilities at a single, example enrichment facil-
ity considering only uranium. This paper considers an entire fuel cycle with multiple MBAs and
nuclear materials, which have different significant quantity and timeliness detection goal limits.
Therefore, there is no guarantee that minimizing the estimated MUF variance yields the “optimal”
configuration based on minimizing Type I error probabilities. However, by scaling the estimated
MUF variance to account for materials with different significant quantity and timeliness detection
goal limits, Section 4.6 shows that the optimal scaled, estimated MUF variance configuration is
also a good, but perhaps not optimal, configuration based on minimizing Type I error probabilities.
Minimum Variance Configuration Model
The Minimum Variance Configuration Model (MVCM) identifies an optimal measurement sys-
tem configuration by minimizing the scaled, estimated MUF variance in a measurement system.
In this paper, MVCM finds the best configuration for an entire fuel cycle, as opposed to the sin-
gle facility considered by Johnson et al. (2016a). MVCM also introduces budget constraints and
costs for measurement methods. Section 4.5 discusses the relevant material forms used in the fuel
cycle. This paper modifies the notation presented in Johnson et al. (2016a) to better address the




f ∈F material forms
k ∈K key measurement points
k ∈ ˆK f key measurement points for material form f
d ∈D measurement methods
d ∈ D̂ f measurement methods for material form f
Parameters
qk true material quantity at key measurement point k (kg)
ēd uncertainty bound for measurement method d (%)
êkd uncertainty bound conversion factor for measurement method d at key measurement
point k (%)
e+k uncertainty bound increment for key measurement point k (kg)
σ̂2k estimated MUF variance scaling factor for key measurement point k (unitless)
cPd purchase cost for measurement method d ($)
cUd utilization cost for measurement method d ($)
bP purchase budget ($)
bU utilization budget ($)
Binary Variables
















Variables in the model are subject to the following constraints:
∑
d∈D̂ f














cUd Xkd ≤ bU (4.6)
Xkd binary ∀ f ∈F ,k ∈ ˆK f ,d ∈ D̂ f (4.7)
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Objective (4.3) minimizes the scaled, estimated MUF variance of a measurement system, which
is a combination of the assumed, true material quantity and the variance associated with the method
used to obtain its estimate. MVCM scales the estimated MUF variance to place equal weighting on
key measurement points that have lower variance contributions because of the required precision
of the methods utilized there. If there is no scaling, MVCM places more importance on key
measurement points that have higher variance contributions, but might not have higher Type I
error probabilities because of different significant quantity and timeliness detection goal limits.
MVCM uses uniform distributions for random uncertainties. A uniform distribution is de-
scribed by its bounds a and b, which form the interval [a,b]. The variance of a uniform distribution
is 1/12(b− a)2 (Ross, 2014, p. 162). Equation (4.8) shows the variance for each measurement














∀ d ∈D (4.8)
For readability, MVCM uses uncertainty bounds rated on a scale of zero to ten percent and then
converts them using êkd to realistic values (Appendix B). The following mathematical expression






∀ f ∈F ,k ∈ ˆK f ,d ∈ D̂ f (4.9)
Constraints (4.4) ensure that there is exactly one method used at each key measurement point.
MVCM in Johnson et al. (2016a) uses each method only once; here, MVCM allows measurement
methods to be utilized at multiple key measurement points that consider the same material form f .
Constraints (4.5) and (4.6) ensure that the purchase and utilization costs of measurements do not
exceed their respective budgets.
Minimum Improved Variance Model
The Minimum Improved Variance Model (MIVM) identifies by how much to increase the preci-
sion of measurement methods within a fixed budget by minimizing the scaled, estimated MUF vari-
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ance of the improved system. MIVM assumes MVCM’s optimal measurement system configura-
tion. Here, the precision of measurement methods increases as their uniform random uncertainty
bounds decrease. If a different distribution characterizes the random measurement uncertainty of a
method, the improvement can be based on a defining characteristic of the distribution, e.g., mean or
variance for a normal distribution. This model uses existing notation and the following additions:
Additional Parameters
cId improvement cost for measurement method d (
$/kg)
bI improvement budget ($)
x∗kd fixed measurement system configuration for measurement method d at key measure-
ment point k (unitless)
Continuous Variables
Ikd uncertainty bound improvement for measurement method d at key measurement
point k (unitless)
Integer Variables
Îkd uncertainty bound improvement scale for measurement method d at key measure-

























cIdqkIkd ≤ bI (4.11)
qkIkd− Îkd = 0 ∀ f ∈F ,k ∈ ˆK f ,d ∈ D̂ f (4.12)
Ikd ≥ 0 ∀ f ∈F ,k ∈ ˆK f ,d ∈ D̂ f (4.13)
Îkd ≥ 0, integer ∀ f ∈F ,k ∈ ˆK f ,d ∈ D̂ f (4.14)
Objective (4.10) minimizes the scaled, estimated MUF variance in a measurement system by
reducing the uncertainty bounds on one or more methods. Constraints (4.11) ensure that the cost
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to improve the methods does not exceed the budget. The expression qkIkd converts the unitless
uncertainty bound improvement to kilograms, which is necessary to correspond to the improvement
cost. Constraints (4.12) ensure that the uncertainty bound reduction is on an integer scale.
Minimum Improvement Cost Model
The Minimum Improvement Cost Model (MICM) determines the most cost-effective way to
reduce the scaled, estimated MUF variance in a system by a pre-specified fraction. MICM incurs
an improvement cost for each kilogram decrease in uncertainty bound for a measurement method.
MICM assumes MVCM’s optimal measurement system configuration as the basis for its system.
This model uses existing notation and the following additions:
Additional Parameters
i pre-specified fraction of scaled, estimated MUF variance reduction (unitless)










































qkIkd− Îkd = 0 ∀ f ∈F ,k ∈ ˆK f ,d ∈ D̂ f (4.17)
Ikd ≥ 0 ∀ f ∈F ,k ∈ ˆK f ,d ∈ D̂ f (4.18)
Îkd ≥ 0, integer ∀ f ∈F ,k ∈ ˆK f ,d ∈ D̂ f (4.19)
Objective (4.15) minimizes the cost to decrease measurement method uncertainty bounds.
MICM scales the improvement cost to place more importance on key measurement points that
SGA determines have higher Type I error probabilities. Constraints (4.16) ensure that the scaled,
estimated MUF variance in a system improves by a pre-specified fraction i. Constraints (4.17)
ensure that the uncertainty bound reduction is on an integer scale.
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4.4.4 SafeGuards Analysis
SafeGuards Analysis (SGA) enables safeguards engineers to evaluate uncertainty across mul-
tiple MBAs. Several other software programs also use simulated uncertainty to estimate material
quantities at various stages in a nuclear fuel cycle (Cipiti & McDaniel, 2012; Cipiti & Zinaman,
2010a,b; Cipiti et al., 2011; Riley et al., 2016; Wilkey & Whitty, 1995). SGA can simulate mea-
surements using multiple forms of uncertainty, although this paper only examines basic random
error. This section gives an overview of SGA.
SGA is a toolkit, not a specific model, which ensures SGA is flexible enough to apply to a
wide range of problems and nuclear fuel cycles. MATLAB Simulink provides an intuitive visual
interface in SGA for users without extensive scientific computing expertise. SGA estimates MUF
values at one or more MBAs based on simulated measurements that include a range of uncertain-
ties. Figure 4.4 shows the basic data flow for a single MBA in SGA.
Figure 4.4: Data flow for a measurement in SGA
Initially, the user translates a source “signal” into an SGA-compatible form using the Input
Interface Block, which represents a single material quantity provided by a separate fuel cycle flow
model. The signal requires either manual or automated translation via a script if the process is
steady-state or time-dependent, respectively. In the Measurement Block, SGA adds uncertainty to
the flow or inventory material quantity to produce a simulated measurement signal; the uncertainty
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is an additive offset to the flow model value.
In the MUF Calculation block, SGA estimates MUF by incorporating the flow and inven-
tory measurements in a material balance equation. Finally, SGA evaluates the estimated MUF
value in the Statistical Analysis block by using various tests, and generates an alarm signal
if a material loss is indicated. Shugart & King (2016) and Shugart et al. (2016) describe
the individual blocks in detail, including the MUF estimate and different statistical tests, such
as the cumulative-material-unaccounted-for, cumulative-sum, and exponential-weighted-moving-
average tests. Beedgen (1988) also uses a cumulative-material-unaccounted-for test in the PRO-
gram for Statistical Analysis (PROSA) software program to identify potential uranium loss from
the Allied General Nuclear Services Barnwell Nuclear Fuels Plant.
SGA models an individual realization of this process for a given MC&A system using Simulink
and the SGA library. A Monte Carlo simulation, using Matlab, evaluates multiple realizations of
the SGA process, which provides Type I and Type II error probabilities. In addition, independent
batches of SGA realizations provide error bounds on the Type I and Type II error probabilities.
The user can define how many realizations and batches are run in the simulation.
4.5 Scenario Description
This paper examines a closed fuel cycle scenario. Figure 4.5 displays the primary facilities in
the fuel cycle, which are labeled based on the materials of concern to safeguards. This scenario
does not include the reactor facility, on-site storage facilities at the reactor, storage locations, or
final repositories for used-nuclear-fuel because material remains in these facilities longer than the
time horizon analyzed in this paper.
NUMSO and SGA obtain material quantities from VISION, which is a software program that
groups facilities into single, black-box MBAs. The downside to this method is that high-fidelity
material tracking is unavailable, which means VISION does not output waste material flows for
many of the MBAs in this fuel cycle scenario (Jacobson & Yacout, 2010).
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Figure 4.5: Closed fuel cycle flow chart
Because of the gap in material flow information at the reactor, the fuel cycle scenario exists
in two parts: the fresh-fuel section, which produces low-enriched uranium (LEU) for use in LEU
reactors, and the separations section, which manufactures mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. Each part has
materials with different significant quantities and timeliness detection goals. The first three MBAs
monitor LEU while the second section of the fuel cycle considers plutonium (in both the used
and MOX fuels) as the material of safeguards concern. Plutonium has a much shorter timeliness
detection goal than LEU (three months for the Separations MBA, and one month for the PuO2 and
MOX Fuel Fabrication MBAs). Furthermore, all MBAs are distinguished based on the material
form they contain.
4.5.1 MC&A Measurement System Problems
Obtaining solutions to the three problems introduced in Section 4.3 demonstrates the capabili-
ties of NUMSO and SGA. Problem 1 places measurement methods in a nuclear fuel cycle given
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fixed purchase and utilization budgets; Problem 2 increases the precision of the methods selected
in Problem 1 given a fixed improvement budget; and Problem 3 reduces measurement uncertainty
in the system while limiting improvement costs. For each problem, NUMSO considers the scaled,
estimated MUF variance, instead of Type I error probabilities, because it is a metric NUMSO can
use to minimize measurement system uncertainty and decrease solution times. SGA obtains Type I
error probabilities because they are more meaningful and actionable to a safeguards engineer than
the mathematical concept of variance.
To provide a solution to Problem 1, NUMSO enhances MVCM to find the best measurement
system configuration based on a pre-defined set of hypothetical measurement methods and pur-
chase and utilization budgets, provided in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.6.1, respectively. This scenario
uses budgets that are limiting based on approximate total average costs, i.e., the product of the
average of all available methods’ costs and the number of key measurement points. These budgets
represent “average” methods, in terms of cost, being utilized at every key measurement point in
the system. In order to ensure that the purchase and utilization budgets are limiting, MVCM also
generates results with an unlimited budget to show that it yields a different solution than with a
fixed budget.
SGA calculates the Type I error probabilities at each MBA that result from NUMSO’s con-
figuration. These probabilities are compared to those from two manual analyses to ensure that
there is no obvious configuration that provides a lower total Type I error probability in the system
than NUMSO’s. The “manual average start” analysis initially selects methods with purchase costs
closest to $500 (the approximate average cost), and then replaces them with more precise meth-
ods, where possible, while remaining under budget. The “manual cheap start” analysis initially
uses methods with the lowest purchase costs, and then replaces them with more precise methods as
resources allow. Combined, these analyses demonstrate that this problem does not have an obvious
optimal configuration and that NUMSO’s solution is non-intuitive.
In Problem 2, MIVM minimizes the scaled, estimated MUF variance of the measurement sys-
tem configuration obtained in Problem 1 by increasing the precision (i.e., decreasing the uniform
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random uncertainty bounds) of measurement methods with a budget that is half of the total aver-
age improvement cost. In this problem, the estimated MUF variance scaling factor σ̂2k input values
change from those provided in Section 4.5.2 to place more importance on the highest Type I error
probabilities SGA outputs in Problem 1 for each key measurement point k. Section 4.6.2 provides
these new scaling factor values.
To verify NUMSO’s results, the “most sensitive” analysis calculates the sensitivity of each
method to determine which ones have the greatest potential Type I error probability reduction.
Method sensitivity is the change in the Type I error probability obtained using each method’s
initial uncertainty bounds and the initial bounds reduced by ±0.05 kg. The analysis decreases the
uncertainty bounds of the most sensitive method as much as possible within the budget, and then,
the most sensitive subsequent methods as resources allow. The “cheapest” analysis reduces the
uncertainty bounds of each method by one unit in their order of sensitivity until there can be no
additional improvements.
In Problem 3, MICM finds the most cost-effective way to reduce the scaled, estimated MUF
variance of the measurement system configuration obtained in Problem 1 by 25%. In this problem,
the improvement cost scaling factor ĉIk input values reflect the relative importance of the Type I
error probabilities SGA outputs in Problem 1 for each key measurement point k. Section 4.6.2
provides the improvement cost scaling factors.
Instead of evaluating the scaled, estimated MUF variance, SGA examines the change in Type
I error probabilities between MICM’s improved configuration and the original configuration from
Problem 1 to observe the impact of increasing measurement method precision. SGA calculates
the Type I error probabilities of the configurations that the most sensitive and cheapest analyses
provide to verify MICM’s results.
This paper presents results from MVCM, MIVM, and MICM modeled in AMPL Version
20130109 (AMPL Optimization LLC, 2013; Fourer et al., 2003) and solved with CPLEX Ver-
sion 12.6.0.1 with default settings (IBM, 2014; IBM ILOG AMPL, 2010). A Sun Fire x4250
workstation under the Ubuntu 14.04 operating system with two Quad-core CPUs running at 2.83
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GHz with 16 GB RAM performs the computations. SGA is implemented in Matlab R2014b (The
MathWorks, Inc., 2014) running on a Mac Pro under the Windows 7 Pro operating system with
twelve Dual-core CPUs running at 2.79 GHz with 96GB RAM. Unless otherwise noted, SGA uses
a Monte Carlo simulation with 100 batches of 1,000 realizations. NUMSO and SGA both utilize
a single core for computations.
4.5.2 Key Measurement Point and Measurement Method Characteristics
A number of traits define each key measurement point in the fuel cycle scenario: the material
type under MC&A control (uranium or plutonium), the material form, and the flow or inventory
material quantity. Differentiating each key measurement point by these three traits prevents them
from appearing nearly identical to another. Having unique key measurement points is important so
that NUMSO does not produce an overabundance of alternate optimal solutions for which SGA
must calculate Type I error probabilities. Table 4.3 shows input values for the material type, form,
and quantity, the uniform random uncertainty bounds and their associated increments e+k , and the
variance scaling factor σ̂2k for each key measurement point k in the fuel cycle scenario.
Each method’s uniform random uncertainty bounds are rated on a scale of zero to ten for ease
of presentation. However, these methods require distinct error bound ranges depending on the
MBA where they are utilized, which accounts for the significant quantity and timeliness detection
goal limits of isotopes at different facilities in the fuel cycle scenario. Methods utilized at the
Separations MBA, PuO2 and MOX-based MBAs, and uranium-based MBAs have measurement
uncertainty ranges between 0.1-0.5, 0.1-0.75, and 1.0-3.0 kilograms, respectively. Appendix B
details the process by which the zero-ten scale is converted into the specific error bounds NUMSO
and SGA use. It is also necessary to ensure that the improvement costs are based on these ranges.
This paper uses ten segments for each range, which corresponds to the unitless, zero-ten uncer-
tainty bound scale. Separations, PuO2 and MOX, and uranium-based key measurement points k
have error bound segment increments e+k of 0.04, 0.065, and 0.2 kilograms, respectively.
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Table 4.3: Key measurement point characteristics













Enrichment Input 119858.2 ±1.0-3.0 0.2 1
Enrichment Output 13643.1 ±1.0-3.0 0.2 1
Enrichment Waste 106215.0 ±1.0-3.0 0.2 1UF6 Flow
UO2 Conversion Input 13643.1 ±1.0-3.0 0.2 0.44
Enrichment Inventory 43029080.4 ±1.0-3.0 0.2 1
UF6 Inventory
UO2 Conversion Inventory 4911521.2 ±1.0-3.0 0.2 0.44
UO2 Conversion Output 136431.0 ±1.0-3.0 0.2 0.44
UO2 Flow
UOX Fuel Fabrication Input 136431.0 ±1.0-3.0 0.2 0.44
UO2 Inventory UOX Fuel Fabrication Inventory 4911521.2 ±1.0-3.0 0.2 0.44
Uranium
U Fuel Rods UOX Fuel Fabrication Output 136431.0 ±1.0-3.0 0.2 0.44
Separations Input 308484.0 ±0.1-0.5 0.04 36
Pu Fuel Rods
MOX Fuel Fabrication Output 147084.0 ±0.1-0.75 0.065 7.1
Aqueous Solution
Flow
Separations Waste 161400.0 ±0.1-0.5 0.04 36
Aqueous Solution
Inventory
Separations Inventory 147084.0 ±0.1-0.5 0.04 36
Separations Output 147084.0 ±0.1-0.5 0.04 36
Pu Nitrate Flow
PuO2 Production Input 147084.0 ±0.1-0.75 0.065 7.1
Pu Nitrate Inventory PuO2 Production Inventory 5295013.5 ±0.1-0.75 0.065 7.1
PuO2 Production Output 147084.0 ±0.1-0.75 0.065 7.1
PuO2 Flow
MOX Fuel Fabrication Input 147084.0 ±0.1-0.75 0.065 7.1
Plutonium
PuO2 Inventory MOX Fuel Fabrication Inventory 5295013.5 ±0.1-0.75 0.065 7.1
The variance scaling factor places a greater importance on MBAs with more key measurement
points (i.e., Enrichment and Separations) to reflect the higher Type I error probabilities that result
from those MBAs due to increased measurement uncertainty. NUMSO also places more weight
on plutonium-based MBAs because they have a lower estimated MUF variance contribution than
uranium-based MBAs, even though they have approximately the same Type I error probabilities.
This method is justified by the use a uniform distribution for each measurement method, because
the variance of a uniformly distributed random variable only changes based on its interval. There-
fore, the least precise measurement methods yield the highest variance contributions and the most
precise methods yield the lowest. This scaling method can also be used for any shift-invariant dis-
tribution, i.e., a distribution in which the mean can be shifted without any change to the variance.
Normal distributions, which are often used to model random measurement errors (Bronshtein &
Semendyayev, 2015, p. 849), are also shift-invariant.
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Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the various hypothetical measurement methods available with which to
estimate different forms of uranium and plutonium material quantities at each stage in the fuel cycle
scenario. Each method has different uniform random uncertainty bounds and associated purchase,
utilization, and improvement costs to reflect the trade-offs between being precise and being more
expensive to purchase, utilize, or both. Without loss of generality, this paper uses dollars to denote
cost units.
Table 4.4: Hypothetical uranium measurement methods and their properties











AC20 ±5 668 4 3
RSFF ±4 855 1 2
TIFD ±10 145 10 8
RPD ±2 909 2 6
UF6 Flow
CED ±7 659 2 2
RDD2 ±6 573 5 8
TIED ±9 195 10 6UF6 Inventory
RSL ±3 814 3 3
D5 ±8 245 10 8
UO2 Flow
T1D ±9 559 2 9
RDD1 ±7 523 5 5
UO2 Inventory
RSB ±4 809 2 5
CTMS5 ±6 573 5 8
U Fuel Rods
CTMS1 ±8 518 4 6
Table 4.5: Hypothetical plutonium measurement methods and their properties











FWS ±10 100 11 10
AC21 ±6 573 5 8
EES ±2 955 1 3Pu Fuel Rods
A8I ±8 291 9 6
CTMS4 ±8 518 4 3Aqueous Solution
Flow ST ±2 500 11 11
A9I ±6 482 7 6Aqueous Solution
Inventory RT5 ±7 477 6 9
TIID ±9 195 10 8
Pu Nitrate Flow
D3IG8 ±8 200 11 10
RSI ±2 909 2 3
Pu Nitrate Inventory
AI92 ±7 341 9 10
A8 ±8 382 7 5
PuO2 Flow
D3IE7 ±4 200 11 9
D6 ±9 241 9 10
PuO2 Inventory
A1I ±6 300 11 11
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4.6 NUMSO Results and Analysis
This section provides NUMSO’s results and analyses for Problems 1-3. This paper uses a
realistic fuel cycle scenario with hypothetical measurement methods to convey the capabilities of
NUMSO and presents examples of the relative differences and trends that it can provide.
4.6.1 Problem 1 NUMSO Results
Table 4.6 shows the optimal measurement system configuration results for unlimited and fixed
budgets. This table also provides the optimal placement of measurement methods for the scaled
and unscaled, estimated MUF variance objectives with a fixed budget. NUMSO takes 1.5 seconds
to generate solutions for Problem 1, compared to 8 hours per SGA analysis.
Table 4.6: Optimal measurement system configuration for unlimited and fixed budgets with
scaled or unscaled, estimated MUF variance objectives. Shaded rows denote key measurement
points at which the same, most precise method is utilized for unlimited and fixed budgets.
Unlimited budget Fixed budget
















Enrichment Input RPD 0.65 RSFF 1.1 RSFF 1.1
Enrichment Output RPD 0.65 RSFF 1.1 RSFF 1.1
Enrichment Waste RPD 0.65 RSFF 1.1 RSFF 1.1
Enrichment Inventory RSL 0.85 RSL 0.85 RDD2 1.6
UO2 Conversion Input RPD 0.29 TIFD 1.3 RSFF 1.1
UO2 Conversion Output D5 1.0 T1D 1.2 D5 2.3
UO2 Conversion Inventory RSL 0.38 TIED 1.2 RSL 0.85
UOX Fuel Fabrication Input D5 1.0 T1D 1.2 T1D 2.6
UOX Fuel Fabrication Output CTMS5 0.72 CTMS1 1.0 CTMS5 1.6
Uranium
UOX Fuel Fabrication Inventory RSB 0.48 RDD1 0.85 RDD1 1.9
Separations Input EES 0.39 EES 0.39 FWS 0.083
Separations Output D3IG8 2.1 D3IG8 2.1 TIID 0.071
Separations Waste ST 0.39 CTMS4 2.1 CTMS4 0.059
Separations Inventory A9I 1.4 A9I 1.4 RT5 0.048
PuO2 Production Input D3IG8 0.91 D3IG8 0.91 TIID 0.16
PuO2 Production Output D3IE7 0.31 D3IE7 0.31 D3IE7 0.043
PuO2 Production Inventory RSI 0.13 AI92 0.73 AI92 0.10
MOX Fuel Fabrication Input D3IE7 0.31 D3IE7 0.31 D3IE7 0.043
MOX Fuel Fabrication Output EES 0.13 FWS 1.3 FWS 0.19
Plutonium
MOX Fuel Fabrication Inventory A1I 0.56 D6 1.1 D6 0.16
Total 13 21 16
Every key measurement point utilizes the most precise measurement methods with an unlimited
budget, as opposed to only 35% and 10% of the key measurement points with a fixed budget
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considering scaled or unscaled, estimated MUF variance, respectively. This means that many
trade-offs are necessary to balance the budget while minimizing the scaled or unscaled, estimated
MUF variance. Table 4.7 shows that the purchase and utilization budgets are limiting in Problem
1 because, although the budgets are not met exactly, there are not enough resources to purchase
or utilize an additional measurement method. The measurement system configuration with a fixed
budget contains methods that are more expensive to use than with an unlimited budget, which helps
offset the scaled, estimated MUF variance reduction from purchasing more imprecise methods.











Unlimited budget ∞ 12,037 ∞ 118
Fixed budget - Scaled 9,316 9,315 126 124
Fixed budget - Unscaled 9,316 9,274 126 126
Plutonium has lower significant quantity and timeliness detection goal limits than uranium,
which indicates that plutonium measurements have a smaller unscaled, estimated MUF variance
contribution than uranium measurements to obtain similar Type I error probabilities. The scaled,
estimated MUF variance contribution at key measurement points containing uranium (11 kg) is
approximately equal to the contribution at plutonium-based key measurement points plutonium (10
kg). This shows the scaling factor is necessary to prevent the unscaled, estimated MUF variance
contribution of uranium (15 kg) from dominating that of plutonium (1.0 kg).
4.6.2 Problem 2 NUMSO Results
Table 4.8 provides the estimated MUF variance and improvement cost scaling factors based
on the Type I error probabilities SGA generates in Problem 1 (presented in Section 4.7). The
estimated MUF variance scaling factors are obtained by weighting the Type I error probability
for each key measurement point (grouped by MBA) based on the highest Type I error probability
in the system (UO2 Conversion). Plutonium-based MBAs have scaling factors greater than one
because they have lower estimated MUF variance contributions than uranium-based MBAs. The
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improvement cost scaling factors are determined similarly, but are based on the lowest Type I error
probability in the system (PuO2 Production), rather than the highest.












σ̂2k 0.2887 1.000 0.7555 23.79 1.062 6.942
ĉIk 0.1022 0.02950 0.03905 0.04466 1.000 0.1530
Table 4.9 shows which measurement methods to improve and how much to reduce their un-
certainty bounds given a budget of $66. MIVM only increases the precision of methods utilized
at the UO2 Conversion and Separations MBAs because they have two of the three highest scaled,
estimated variance contributions, and similarly, the highest Type I error probabilities. These im-
provements reduce the scaled, estimated MUF variance by 13%. NUMSO takes 0.13 seconds to
generate solutions for Problem 2, compared to 8.5 hours per SGA analysis.










UO2 Conversion Output T1D 0.80 24 0.57
UO2 Conversion Inventory TIED 0.80 24 0.57
Separations Waste CTMS4 0.24 18 1.7
Total 1.8 66 2.9
MIVM uses the most resources to reduce the uncertainty bounds of the methods utilized at the
UO2 Conversion MBA because they are very imprecise with uncertainty bounds of Uniform(-9,
9). Even though these methods are fairly expensive to improve, reducing their uncertainty bounds
has the largest potential reduction to Type I error probabilities. Section 4.7 shows that the UO2
Conversion and Separations MBAs have two of the three highest Type I error probabilities for the
optimal measurement system configuration obtained in Problem 1. These results indicate that it
might be more beneficial to enhance imprecise, rather than the cheapest, measurement methods
because they give the highest Type I error probabilities.
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4.6.3 Problem 3 NUMSO Results
Table 4.10 shows which measurement methods to improve and how much to reduce their un-
certainty bounds to reduce the scaled, estimated MUF variance by at least 25% in the most cost-
effective manner. MICM reduces the scaled, estimated MUF variance by just over 25% with
an improvement cost of $90. NUMSO takes 0.35 seconds to generate solutions for Problem 3,
compared to 8.0 hours per SGA analysis.











Enrichment Input RSFF 0.6 6 0.60
Enrichment Output RSFF 0.4 4 0.43
Enrichment Waste RSFF 0.4 4 0.43
UO2 Conversion Output T1D 0.4 12 0.31
UO2 Conversion Inventory TIED 0.2 6 0.16
Separations Input EES 0.08 6 0.27
Separations Output D3IG8 0.04 10 0.38
Separations Waste CTMS4 0.32 24 2.0
Separations Inventory A9I 0.12 18 0.81
Total 3.0 90 5.4
Similar to Problem 2, MICM uses a large portion of the improvement cost to reduce the un-
certainty bounds of methods at the UO2 Conversion MBA. In addition, MICM allocates a large
portion of resources at the Separations MBA, which has very imprecise methods (except for EES)
and the third highest Type I error probability. However, these results also show that MICM im-
proves methods at the Enrichment MBA, which has fairly precise, but cheap-to-improve methods,
indicating that it is also beneficial to reduce the uncertainty bounds of methods with a low im-
provement cost.
Figure 4.6 shows that there is a nonlinear relationship between the scaled, estimated MUF
variance and the improvement cost. This result indicates that there might be a point at which an
additional percent reduction in the scaled, estimated MUF variance is no longer worth the cost.
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Figure 4.6: Relationship between the scaled, estimated MUF variance reduction and improvement
cost
4.7 SGA Results and Analysis
This section illustrates the comparative analysis done in SGA to examine NUMSO’s results.
For Problems 1-3, SGA manually creates intuitive solutions using several analyses and compares
them to NUMSO’s results. There is no guarantee that minimizing the scaled, estimated MUF
variance in a multi-material measurement system yields the same configuration and improvements
as minimizing Type I error probabilities. Unlike NUMSO, SGA’s ability to calculate Type I error
probabilities for each MBA, or any combination of MBAs, makes it an ideal tool to analyze if
minimizing the scaled, estimated MUF variance yields good results.
4.7.1 Problem 1 SGA Results
Table 4.11 shows the configurations from the manual average start and manual cheap start SGA
analyses and NUMSO are very different, which implies that the optimal configuration based on the
scaled, estimated MUF variance is not intuitive. Only 25% of the key measurement points contain
the same measurement method for all three analyses.
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Table 4.11: Measurement system configurations obtained from two SGA analyses and NUMSO.
Shaded rows denote key measurement points at which the same method is utilized.
Measurement methods






Enrichment Input CED CED RSFF
Enrichment Output RSFF RPD RSFF
Enrichment Waste TIFD CED RSFF
Enrichment Inventory RDD2 T1D RSL
UO2 Conversion Input RSFF CED TIFD
UO2 Conversion Output T1D T1D T1D
UO2 Conversion Inventory RDD2 RDD2 TIED
UOX Fuel Fabrication Input T1D D5 T1D
UOX Fuel Fabrication Output CTMS1 CTMS1 CTMS1
Uranium
UOX Fuel Fabrication Inventory RDD1 RDD1 RDD1
Separations Input FWS A8I EES
Separations Output D3IG8 TIID D3IG8
Separations Waste ST ST CTMS4
Separations Inventory A9I RT5 A9I
PuO2 Production Input D3IG8 TIID D3IG8
PuO2 Production Output A8 D3IE7 D3IE7
PuO2 Production Inventory AI92 AI92 AI92
MOX Fuel Fabrication Input A8 A8I D3IE7
MOX Fuel Fabrication Output AC21 AC21 FWS
Plutonium
MOX Fuel Fabrication Inventory D6 D6 D6
Table 4.12 shows the Type I error probabilities that result from the configurations produced
using the most (best possible) and least (worst possible) precise measurement methods, each SGA
analysis, and NUMSO. For some of the individual MBAs, the SGA analyses yield lower Type
I error probabilities than the NUMSO measurement system configuration, such as for the UO2
Conversion and MOX Fuel Fabrication MBAs. However, this comes at the cost of having higher
Type I error probabilities for nearly every other MBA. The SGA analyses do not provide an intu-
itive solution that is objectively better than NUMSO’s. This result reinforces that for a simplified
example, such as this, NUMSO is able to generate a comparable solution far faster than intuitive
analyses (1.5 seconds compared to 8.0 hours per SGA analysis).
4.7.2 Problem 2 SGA Results
For Problem 2, SGA uses the most sensitive and cheapest analyses to compare the Type I error
probabilities that result from their improvements to those from NUMSO. Table 4.13 shows the
sensitivity of Type I error probabilities at each key measurement point; the probabilities are calcu-
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Table 4.12: Problem 1 Type I error probabilities at each MBA for SGA analyses and NUMSO












Worst possible 18.25±1.13 9.50±0.99 7.00±0.77 21.86±1.29 4.55±0.64 7.72±0.92 68.88±2.4
Best possible 0.46±0.19 1.89±0.42 4.28±0.64 0.96±0.34 0.00±0.02 0.00±0.00 7.59±0.86
Manual average start 10.40±0.95 3.75±0.56 7.00±0.77 10.30±0.92 2.73±0.48 1.03±0.35 35.21±1.7
Manual cheap start 6.01±0.72 6.19±0.85 6.20±0.77 8.36±0.96 0.69±0.26 0.02±0.04 27.47±1.7
NUMSO 2.74±0.58 9.49±0.92 7.17±0.88 6.27±0.37 0.28±0.18 1.83±0.40 27.78±1.5
lated by improving the random uncertainty bounds of each method by ±0.05 kg. Because of the
inherently small difference between the original and improved Type I error probabilities, the sensi-
tivity analysis uses a Monte Carlo method with 200 batches of 4,000 SGA realizations. Even with
this increase in the number of realizations, there are only four key measurement points at which the
difference in Type I error probabilities in the sensitivity analysis exceeds three standard deviations
with a 99% confidence interval. These are Separations Output and Waste, PuO2 Production Input,
and MOX Fuel Fabrication Output.
Table 4.13: SGA sensitivity analysis on the Type I error probabilities at each key measurement
point. Shaded rows denote the key measurement points SGA uses in the most sensitive analysis.
Key measurement point










Enrichment Input 2.74 2.56 0.18 0.26 No
Enrichment Output 2.74 2.54 0.20 0.25 No
Enrichment Waste 2.74 2.57 0.17 0.26 No
Enrichment Inventory 2.74 2.68 0.06 0.26 No
UO2 Conversion Input 9.49 9.09 0.40 0.47 No
UO2 Conversion Output 9.49 9.16 0.33 0.47 No
UO2 Conversion Inventory 9.49 9.41 0.08 0.44 No
UOX Fuel Fabrication Input 7.17 6.85 0.32 0.42 No
UOX Fuel Fabrication Output 7.17 6.89 0.28 0.41 No
UOX Fuel Fabrication Inventory 7.17 7.14 0.03 0.40 No
Separations Input 6.27 5.48 0.79 0.33 No
Separations Output 6.27 4.37 1.90 0.35 Yes
Separations Waste 6.27 4.39 1.88 0.32 Yes
Separations Inventory 6.27 6.11 0.16 0.39 No
PO2 Production Input 0.28 0.10 0.18 0.05 Yes
PO2 Production Output 0.28 0.14 0.14 0.06 No
PO2 Production Inventory 0.28 0.22 0.06 0.08 No
MOX Fuel Fabrication Output 1.83 1.32 0.51 0.17 No
MOX Fuel Fabrication Output 1.83 0.94 0.89 0.15 Yes
MOX Fuel Fabrication Inventory 1.83 1.69 0.14 0.20 No
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Based on these values, the most sensitive analysis focuses on improving the uncertainty bounds
of methods at these four key measurement points. The cheapest analysis increases each of the
lowest improvement cost methods with the process described in Section 4.5.1. Table 4.14 shows
the cost expenditures and uncertainty bound improvement amounts for NUMSO and the two SGA
analyses.
Table 4.14: Measurement method uncertainty bound improvement amounts and cost expenditures
at key measurement points for a fixed budget of $66 using NUMSO and two SGA analyses














Enrichment Input 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.80 8
Enrichment Output 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.80 8
Enrichment Waste 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.80 8
Enrichment Inventory 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.60 9
UO2 Conversion Input 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0
UO2 Conversion Output 0.80 24 0.00 0 0.00 0
UO2 Conversion Inventory 0.80 24 0.00 0 0.00 0
UOX Fuel Fabrication Inventory 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.60 15
Separations Input 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.13 6
Separations Output 0.00 0 0.08 20 0.00 0
Separations Waste 0.24 18 0.08 6 0.16 12
PO2 Production Input 0.00 0 0.13 20 0.00 0
MOX Fuel Fabrication Output 0.00 0 0.13 20 0.00 0
Table 4.15 shows the Type I error probabilities for each SGA analysis and NUMSO at each
MBA. The base analysis represents the original configuration without improvements. This table
shows that for a budget of $66, NUMSO provides the best improvement, although it is only slightly
better than the solution from the cheapest analysis. This result occurs because NUMSO focuses
on improving UO2 Conversion, which has the highest Type I error probability. The limitation of
the most sensitive analysis is that the key measurement points with the highest sensitivity in this
configuration have relatively low Type I error probabilities. Hence, while these improvements have
a large relative impact on Type I error probabilities, this analysis uses much of the budget at key
measurement points that have a comparatively low total Type I error probability in the system,
which limits their effectiveness.
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Table 4.15: Problem 2 Type I error probabilities at each MBA for SGA analyses and NUMSO












Base 2.74±0.58 9.49±0.92 7.17±0.88 6.27±0.37 0.28±0.18 1.83±0.40 27.78±1.5
Most sensitive 2.65±0.56 9.32±0.85 7.07±0.70 1.51±0.38 0.01±0.04 0.28±0.16 20.84±1.3
Cheapest 0.01±0.02 9.61±0.91 6.90±0.76 1.09±0.30 0.28±0.18 1.84±0.43 19.73±1.3
NUMSO 2.69±0.55 5.60±0.64 7.23±0.80 0.97±0.29 0.23±0.16 1.90±0.43 18.62±1.3
4.7.3 Problem 3 SGA Results
For Problem 3, SGA uses the most sensitive and cheapest analyses to compare Type I error
probabilities against those that result from NUMSO’s measurement system configuration. For
each analysis, the improvement is bounded by the cost incurred by NUMSO of $90. Table 4.16
shows the cost expenditures and uncertainty bound improvement amounts for NUMSO and the
two SGA analyses.
Table 4.16: Measurement method uncertainty bound improvement amounts and cost expenditures
at key measurement points for a fixed budget of $90 using NUMSO and two SGA analyses














Enrichment Input 0.60 6 0.00 0 1.0 10
Enrichment Output 0.40 4 0.00 0 1.0 10
Enrichment Waste 0.40 4 0.00 0 1.0 10
Enrichment Inventory 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.80 12
UO2 Conversion Input 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0
UO2 Conversion Output 0.40 12 0.00 0 0.20 6
UO2 Conversion Inventory 0.20 6 0.00 0 0.20 6
UOX Fuel Fabrication Inventory 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.60 15
Separations Input 0.08 6 0.00 0 0.10 6
Separations Output 0.04 10 0.12 30 0.00 0
Separations Waste 0.32 24 0.12 9 0.20 15
Separations Inventory 0.12 18 0.00 0 0.00 0
PO2 Production Input 0.00 0 0.13 20 0.00 0
MOX Fuel Fabrication Output 0.00 0 0.20 30 0.00 0
Table 4.17 shows the Type I error probabilities for each SGA analysis and NUMSO at each
MBA. The base analysis represents the original configuration without improvements. NUMSO
obtains the best total Type I error probability in the system. Similar to the results in Problem 2, the
configuration from the most sensitive analysis does not provide the greatest improvement. These
results indicate that NUMSO is able to provide a better total Type I error probability than two
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Table 4.17: Problem 3 Type I error probabilities at each MBA for SGA analyses and NUMSO












Base 2.74±0.58 9.49±0.92 7.17±0.88 6.27±0.37 0.28±0.18 1.83±0.40 27.78±1.5
Most sensitive 2.76±0.54 9.50±0.99 7.00±0.77 0.50±0.23 0.01±0.03 0.09±0.09 19.86±1.4
Cheapest 0.00±0.00 8.35±0.96 7.16±0.79 4.11±0.64 0.24±0.14 1.79±0.43 21.65±1.5
NUMSO 0.30±0.18 7.28±0.81 7.19±0.90 0.11±0.10 0.23±0.15 1.87±0.46 16.98±1.3
intuitive analyses, although there is no guarantee that it is optimal.
4.8 Conclusion
The dangerous ability to make nuclear weapons from uranium-235 and plutonium-239 makes
it imperative to account closely for these materials as they progress through a nuclear fuel cycle.
Many instances of theft or loss of nuclear and other radioactive material have occurred in the last
two decades, which indicate that the potential loss of this material is still a threat. Improving
MC&A methods gives a more accurate estimate of material quantities and MUF in the system.
This paper provides solutions to three potential problems in MC&A measurement systems: how
to (i) locate measurement methods in a nuclear fuel cycle given fixed purchase and utilization bud-
gets (Problem 1), (ii) increase the precision of existing methods given a fixed improvement budget
(Problem 2), and (iii) reduce measurement uncertainty in the system while limiting improvement
costs (Problem 3). NUMSO uses operations research techniques, specifically, integer program-
ming, to find optimal solutions to these problems based on minimizing the scaled, estimated MUF
variance in the system. SGA employs a Monte Carlo simulation to analyze if NUMSO provides
good solutions in terms of the Type I error probabilities in a measurement system.
This paper examines a closed fuel cycle scenario that does not include the reactor facility, on-
site storage facilities at the reactor, storage locations, or final repositories for used-nuclear-fuel
because material remains in these facilities longer than the time horizon analyzed in this paper.
NUMSO and SGA use hypothetical measurement methods because the focus of this paper is to
demonstrate their ability to provide answers to representative problems.
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Results from SGA analyses show that NUMSO provides a measurement system configuration
in Problem 1 and improvements in Problems 2-3 that not only minimize the scaled, estimated
MUF variance, but also yield similar or better total Type I error probabilities compared to intuitive
analyses. For every problem, NUMSO has a much smaller solution time than the SGA analyses.
The quick solution times also indicate that much larger, more complicated fuel cycle scenarios can
be examined using NUMSO.
SGA provides accurate Type I error probabilities for each MBA in the fuel cycle, which is a
more meaningful metric to safeguards engineers than estimated MUF variance. This paper shows
that for this fuel cycle scenario, NUMSO yields similar or better solutions in terms of Type I error
probabilities much faster than several intuitive analyses. However, the authors recommend that a
thorough comparison be performed using SGA to ensure that, for a specific application, NUMSO
yields acceptable Type I error probabilities.
Further research could examine whether there is a mathematical relationship between signif-
icant quantity and timeliness detection goal limits for different isotopes and the estimated MUF
variance in a measurement system. Such a connection could provide a better justification for the
variance scaling factors to relate the scaled, estimated MUF variance and the Type I error probabil-
ities. Additionally, SGA and NUMSO could evaluate a larger, more complex fuel cycle scenario
to show their extensibility.
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This dissertation shows that operations research techniques yield solutions that provide better
objective values and are able to be obtained faster than solutions from existing and intuitive meth-
ods in nuclear waste disposal and nuclear safeguards. Our results highlight the benefit of using
operations research techniques to solve complex nuclear energy problems and indicate that larger,
more complicated applications can be examined with these techniques.
In the first paper, we develop a mixed-integer programming model that creates an optimal, re-
producible schedule for nuclear waste placement, using the Yucca Mountain repository in Nevada
as a case study. The optimal solution determines where to place each waste package of a specific
type in a given time period with the goal of minimizing heat load concentration within a repository.
Existing filling methods give at least a 17% to an 873% higher, i.e., worse, heat load concentra-
tion in the repository with respect to these objectives than do optimal methods. The performance
enhancements incorporated in the model increase the solvable model size. This research can be
applied to any of the repositories planned for operation around the world with slight modifications
to incorporate site-specific objectives and constraints.
In the second paper, we use a simulation-optimization algorithm and an integer-programming
model to find the optimal measurement system configuration with a pre-specified level of confi-
dence. We obtain similar results to existing outcomes, but are able to generate them at least an
order of magnitude faster. In the third paper, we develop two mixed-integer quadratic program-
ming models to increase the precision of existing measurement methods given a fixed improvement
budget and to reduce the measurement uncertainty in the system while limiting improvement costs.
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APPENDIX A - MVCM PROPERTIES
In this appendix we derive the properties of the MVCM formulation for a single key measure-
ment point. We begin by considering a continuous time C̃t modeled by a Gaussian Process.
Type I error case:
Let C̃1t be a Gaussian Process without drift, and Var(C̃1,t+τ − C̃1t) = σ21 τ with independent
increments. Let Tλ be the first time C̃1t = λ .
Let C̃2t be a Gaussian Process without drift, and Var(C̃2,t+τ − C̃2t) = σ22 τ with independent
increments where σ22 < σ
2
1 . Let Sλ be the first time C̃2t = λ .
P(C̃1t ≥ λ ) = P(C̃1t ≥ λ |Tλ ≤ t)P(Tλ ≤ t)+P(C̃1t ≥ λ |Tλ > t)P(Tλ > t) (A.1)
note P(C̃1t ≥ λ |Tλ ≤ t) =
1
2
and P(C̃1t ≥ λ |Tλ > t) = 0 (A.2)
⇒ P(Tλ ≤ t) = 2P(C̃1t ≥ λ ) (A.3)
Similarly,
P(Sλ ≤ t) = 2P(C̃2t ≥ λ ) (A.4)
Now, we have:























)dy = P(C̃2t ≥ λ ) (A.5)
Therefore, reducing the variance at a single key measurement point reduces the Type I error
probability for a device at that key measurement point before any time t.
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Type II error case:
Let C̃1t be a Gaussian Process with drift Ct , and Var(C̃1,t+τ − C̃1t) = σ21 τ with independent
increments. Let Tλ be the first time C̃1t = λ .
Let C̃2t be a Gaussian Process with drift Ct , and Var(C̃2,t+τ − C̃2t) = σ22 τ with independent
increments where σ22 < σ
2
1 . Let Sλ be the first time C̃2t = λ .
P(C̃1t ≥ λ ) = P(C̃1t ≥ λ |Tλ ≤ t)P(Tλ ≤ t)+P(C̃1t ≥ λ |Tλ > t)P(Tλ > t) (A.6)



















P(C̃1t ≥ λ ) (A.8)
Similarly,









P(C̃2t ≥ λ ) (A.9)
Now, we have:





































= P(Sλ ≥ t) (A.11)
This implies no guarantee of a lower Type II error probability at a given key measurement point
and before any time t by lowering the measurement error at that key measurement point, as was
seen in SOCA simulations. We can, therefore, conclude that, lowering the measurement error
generating C̃t provides a lower Type I error probability at a given key measurement point before
any time t, but may not lower the Type II error probability. However, we note that the Type II
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error probability is oftentimes lowered in SOCA simulations. Because these results hold for every
t denoting continuous time, they also hold for C̃t where t = 1, . . . ,T , indexing discrete time by
means of integration with respect to t. Finally, these results are suggestive of a general pattern for
T large enough, as C̃t will converge to a Gaussian random variable as t→ ∞ by the Central Limit
Theorem.
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APPENDIX B - UNCERTAINTY BOUND TRANSLATION
NUMSO directly translates the uncertainty bounds in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 into percent values
(e.g., a bound of 4 is 4%) and then scales them to correspond to the kilogram-based bounds in SGA.
Table B.1 shows the scaling factors used to translate the initial uncertainty bounds to percent-based
bounds. Equation B.1 shows how to relate the percent-based uncertainty bounds in NUMSO to






∀ f ∈F ,k ∈ ˆK f ,d ∈ D̂ f (B.1)
For example, consider measurement method TIFD at the Enrichment Input key measurement








































AC20 299645.500 34107.7500 265537.500 34107.7500 - - - - - -
RSFF 263351.556 30318.0000 236033.333 30318.0000 - - - - - -
TIFD 399527.333 45477.0000 354050.000 45477.0000 - - - - - -
RPD 171226.000 19490.1429 151735.714 19490.1429 - - - - - -
CED 349586.417 39792.3750 309793.750 39792.3750 - - - - - -
RDD2 - - - - 117352037. 13395057.8 - - - -
TIED - - - - 138307858. 15787032.4 - - - -
RSL - - - - 80679525.8 9209102.25 - - - -
D5 - - - - - - 41978.7692 41978.7692 - -
T1D - - - - - - 43852.8214 43852.8214 - -
RDD1 - - - - - - - - 14325270.2 -
RSB - - - - - - - - 10914491.6 -
CTMS5 - - - - - - - - - 37208.4545





























FWS 616968.000 196112.000 - - - - - - - -
AC21 544383.529 180102.857 - - - - - - - -
EES 342760.000 127899.130 - - - - - - - -
A8I 587588.571 189785.806 - - - - - - - -
CTMS4 - - 307428.571 - - - - - - -
ST - - 179333.333 - - - - - - -
A9I - - - 259560.000 - - - - - -
RT5 - - - 270944.211 - - - - - -
TIID - - - - 287773.044 193249.051 - - - -
D3IG8 - - - - 280160.000 189785.806 - - - -
RSI - - - - - - 46043595.7 - - -
AI92 - - - - - - 66783954.1 - - -
A8 - - - - - - - 189785.807 189785.807 -
D3IE7 - - - - - - - 163426.667 163426.667 -
D6 - - - - - - - - - 69569520.4
A1I - - - - - - - - - 64836900.0
